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I.

INTRODUCTION

The journalist's email arrived on a Monday morning. "Can
you settle a class-action lawsuit in secret?" he asked.' The parties to
a putative federal class action had filed a joint motion the preceding
Friday, seeking a confidentiality order "sealing all documents related
to the settlement" of the litigation, including the stipulation of
settlement, the notice of proposed settlement, the motion seeking
approval of the settlement, any order entered by the court regarding
the settlement, transcripts of the fairness hearing, and any objections
filed by class members.2 A proposed order, filed with the motion,
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. A.B., Cornell
University; J.D., Yale Law School. I am grateful to Ian Everhart for diligent
research assistance and perennial good cheer; to Susanna Leers, Sallie Smith, and
Linda Tashbook for excellent library services; and to Robert V. Barth, Jr., Clerk of
Court of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania,
for generous assistance with the empirical study described in Part III.B of this
Article. I would also like to thank those in attendance at a University of Pittsburgh
School of Law colloquium for their constructive feedback. Finally, I am grateful
to Ettie Ward and Michelle Slack for inviting me to participate in the Section of
Litigation meeting at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools, at which I presented this Article.
1. E-mail from Brian Bowling, Reporter, PITT. TRIB.-REv., to author (Mar.
14, 2011, 9:45 a.m. EST) (on file with author).
2. Consented-To Motion to Maintain Settlement Documents Under Seal at
3, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3,
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further directed the state and federal officials to whom the settlement
documents would be provided pursuant to the Class Action Fairness
Act 3 to maintain their confidentiality. 4
"Can you settle a class-action lawsuit in secret?"
The question threw me for a loop. Of course I was aware that
parties to civil litigation settle cases every day of the week and
routinely seek to shield from public scrutiny both the terms of the
settlement and the inculpatory documents produced in discovery.
But can you settle a class action lawsuit in secret?
This Article seeks to answer that question. It proceeds in
four parts. To illustrate the practice of settling a federal class action
under seal, Part I examines the class action lawsuit that prompted the
journalist's email. While a case study can vividly present the issues
raised by the practice, it cannot capture its scope or incidence. Part
II, then, seeks to ascertain the scope of the practice of settling class
actions under seal. Part III.A reveals several permutations of the
practice gleaned from newspaper accounts describing class action
settlements from around the country. Part III.B focuses on a single
federal judicial district-the Western District of Pennsylvania-and
seeks to ascertain the percentage of suits filed as class actions that
were settled under seal. Having gained some understanding of the
scope of the practice, the Article then seeks to assess it normatively.
Part IV analyzes the policy debate surrounding secret settlements of
civil suits in general, fleshing out the competing policy objectives
served by public access to, and confidentiality of, settlement
agreements, including those submitted to courts for their approval.
Finally, Part V examines the statutory, logistical and policy-based
constraints that call into serious question the legality, efficacy, and
wisdom of secret class action settlements.

II.

CASE STUDY: THE B'NAI B'RITH LITIGATION

On October 23, 2009, Dean and Melva Hirschfield and thirty2011), ECF No. 142 [hereinafter Consented-To Motion].
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (2006).
4. Proposed Order at 2, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535DSC (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2011), ECF No. 142-1.
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two other named plaintiffs filed a verified class action complaint in
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania,
against B'nai B'rith International ("BBI"), a worldwide Jewish
service organization, and ten individuals affiliated with BBI, among
other defendants.5 The plaintiffs sought recovery of deposits that
they (or their decedents) had paid to gain entry into a continuing-care
retirement community in Mount Lebanon, Pennsylvania, a suburb of
Pittsburgh.6
According to the complaint, BBI had formed the Covenant of
South Hills, Inc. ("Covenant") to develop the retirement
community. 7 The plaintiffs or their decedents had paid deposits
(each as much as several hundred thousand dollars) to Covenant to
secure entry into the facility's independent living homes. 8 In each
Residency Agreement, Covenant agreed to refund a large percentage
of the de osit when the resident vacated the home and it was reoccupied.
Plaintiffs alleged that BBI's name or logo appeared on the
5. Class Action Complaint, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. GD 0919799 (Ct. Com. Pl. Allegheny Cnty. Oct. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Class Action
Complaint]. Two other Class Action Complaints were filed in the same state court
against the same defendants, alleging the same facts, pressing some or all of the
same claims and purporting to represent the same class. See Class Action
Complaint, Hartman v. Levin, No. GD 09-23090 (Ct. Com. Pl. Allegheny Cnty.
Dec. 11, 2009) (raising some of the same claims); Class Action Complaint, PNC
Bank v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. GD 10-004055 (Ct. Com. Pl. Allegheny Cnty. Apr.
21, 2010) (raising all of the same claims). Like Hirschfield, Hartman and PNC
Bank were removed to federal court and eventually consolidated with Hirschfield
for pretrial purposes. Order of Court, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. July 27, 2010), ECF No. 110. To simplify the narrative,
this Article will focus primarily on the Hirschfield case and will ignore all
defendants except BBI and the individual defendants.
6. Toby Tabachnick, Former Covenant Residents File Second Lawsuit
(2010), http://www.thejewish
Against B'nai B'rith, JEWISH CHRON.
chronicle.net/view/full story/4982346/article-Former-Covenant--residents-file-sec
ond-lawsuit-against-B%E2%80%99nai-B%E2%80%99rith (last visited Mar. 24,
2012).
7. Class Action Complaint, supra note 5, at 13-14, 19-20.
8. Motion to Abstain and/or Remand to State Court at 3, Hirschfield v. B'nai
B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2009), ECF No. 13;
Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Class Certification at 3, Hirschfield v.
B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2010), ECF No. 59
[hereinafter Plaintiffs' Brief in Support].
9. Class Action Complaint, supra note 5, at 6, 17.
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marketing materials distributed to the public, on Covenant's signage
and letterhead, and on the Residency Agreements signed by the
plaintiffs. 10 Covenant's directors were BBI officers, directors,
employees and outside counsel. " According to the complaint,
plaintiffs were led to believe that BBI was "either the owner or
principal of the Facility and would fully stand behind the obligations
of Covenant." 1 2
When Covenant later filed for protection under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code, 13 the plaintiffs' efforts to recoup their deposits
from Covenant's assets in the bankruptcy proceeding failed. 14
Neither BBI nor the entity that acquired Covenant's assets,
Concordia Lutheran Ministries, assumed Covenant's obligation to
refund the resident deposits. 15 Class action litigation against BBI
and several of its officers and directors ensued.
The thirty-four named plaintiffs who filed the class action
complaint purported to represent a class
consisting of all . . . Residents, former Residents

and/or their successors-in-interest who are or were
parties to a Residency Agreement and who have not
received and will not receive all benefits due them
under their Residency Agreements including, but not
limited to, payment of the Deposit Refunds and other
benefits. 16
10. Id. at 5, 15-16.
11. Id. at 5, 7, 15.
12. Id. at 17. See also id. at 7, 21 (explaining that plaintiffs tendered deposits
"with the understanding and justifiable belief' that Covenant was "owned and
sponsored by" BBI and that plaintiffs relied on "marketing materials circulated by"
BBI as well as "other public representations and statements" concerning BBI's
ownership, control, and sponsorship of Covenant).
13. Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition and Statement Regarding Corporate
Resolution, In re The Covenant at South Hills, Inc., No. 09-20121-JKF (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2009), ECF No. 1.
14. See Order Requiring the Debtor to Determine Whether to Assume or
Reject Residency Agreements at 1, In re The Covenant at South Hills, Inc., No.
09-20121-JKF (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2009), ECF No. 584 (rejecting the
residency agreements).
15. Class Action Complaint, supra note 5, at 6.
16. Id. at 26-27. Plaintiffs' brief in support of its motion to certify the class
estimated a class of approximately 150. Plaintiffs' Brief in Support, supra note 8,
at 8.
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The complaint alleged a host of claims, including breach of contract,
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, violation of the Pennsylvania
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, civil
conspiracy, negligent undertaking, breach of fiduciary duty, active
malfeasance, unjust enrichment, bailment, and violation of the
Pennsylvania Continuing-Care Provider Registration and Disclosure
Act. "

The defendants promptly removed the action to the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania' 8 and
simultaneously moved to transfer the case to the United States
Bankruptcy Court. 19 While plaintiffs' motion to abstain and/or
remand to state court 20 was pending, they moved for class
certification, claiming a class of approximately 150 members.21 In
their motion to certify, plaintiffs defined the proposed class as all
persons and entities "[w]ho had unsatisfied rights to [a] refund of a
portion of their Resident Deposits" as of the date that Covenant filed
its bankruptcy petition. 22
While these motions were still pending, the parties jointly
filed a Stipulated Agreement and Protective Order on Confidentiality
(the "Protective Order"), which permitted either the plaintiffs or
defendants to designate as confidential any discovery material
(broadly defined) "that the designating Party in good faith believes
contains (i) confidential personal information; (ii) confidential
17. Class Action Complaint, supra note 5, at 28, 30, 32, 35, 39, 42, 46-47,
49-50, 54, 56-57. Not all of the claims were brought against all of the defendants.
18. Notice of Removal, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535DSC (W.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2009), ECF No. 1-4 [hereinafter Notice of Removal].
See also Consent Motion to Amend/Correct Notice of Removal, Hirschfield v.
B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2010), ECF No. 18
(removing the case). The Notice of Removal invoked section 1452 of Title 28 of
the United States Code, which authorizes removal of cases under title 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code as well as "civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in
or related to cases under title 11." Notice of Removal, at 2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b),
1452(a) (2006).
19. Motion to Transfer Case to Bankruptcy Court, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith
Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2009), ECF No. 2.
20. Motion to Abstain and/or Remand to State Court, Hirschfield v. B'nai
B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2009), ECF No. 13.
21. Motion for Class Certification at 2, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No.
2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2010), ECF No. 58; Plaintiffs' Brief in
Support, supra note 8, at 8.
22. Plaintiffs' Brief in Support, supra note 8, at 6.

894

THE RE VIEW OFLITIGATION

[Vol. 3 1:4

business information; (iii) trade secrets; or (iv) sensitive proprietary,
commercial, financial, or customer information . . . ."23 The district

judge signed the Protective Order several days later, on May 25,
2010. 24 The Protective Order limited the persons to whom
confidential information could be disclosed and the uses to which it
could be put. 25 It contemplated that third-party recipients of
confidential information would sign a consent to be bound by the
terms of the Protective Order.26 The order further required that
counsel for any party seeking to file confidential information with
the court do so under seal.2 7 With certain exceptions, the Protective
Order required the parties to destroy or return all confidential
information to the producing party at the conclusion of the

litigation. 28
In the fall of 2010, pursuant to the mandatory alternative
dispute resolution program of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, 29 the parties and their insurers met
with a mediator and ultimately "reached an agreement on the
monetary terms of a settlement . . . ."30 The Joint Status Report

23. Stipulated Agreement and Protective Order on Confidentiality at 2,
Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. May 19,
2010), ECF No. 80.
24. Stipulated Agreement and Protective Order on Confidentiality (signed),
Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. May 25,
2010), ECF No. 83 [hereinafter Protective Order].
25. Id. 4, 11. The Protective Order further permitted a party to designate
discovery material containing "proprietary, marketing, sensitive personal, medical,
financial or other strategic information that the Party .

.

. believes, in good faith,

will be reasonably expected to cause harm to the designating Party by its mere
disclosure

to

the

non-designating

Party

.

.

.

."

as

"CONFIDENTIAL-ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY," and limited its disclosure
even more stringently. Id. 5, 6.
26. Id.
9; Consent to Stipulated Agreement and Protective Order on
Confidentiality, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D.
Pa. May 25, 2010), ECF No. 83-1 (Exhibit A).
27. Protective Order, supra note 24, at 14. In light of the Protective Order,
the parties filed, and the court granted, numerous motions to file under seal briefs
referring to documents that had been designated as confidential. See, e.g., Motion
for Leave to File Under Seal, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535DSC (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2010), ECF No. 97; Order of Court, Hirschfield v. B'nai
B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. June 15, 2010), ECF No. 99.
28. Protective Order, supra note 24, 16.
29. W.D. PA. LocAL CIv. R. OF CT. 16.2.
30. Joint Status Report at 1, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-
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submitted to the court on December 1, 2010 stated that "[t]he Parties
anticipate filing a joint motion for class certification and preliminary
approval of the settlement in the near future . . . ."31 At a status

conference in late January 2011, the parties presented the court with
"an update of the status of the settlement" and explained how they
intended "to proceed with regard to class certification, notices, [and]
waiver of rights to opt out and/or object." 32 The court approved the
proposed procedures.3 3
In mid-March 2011, the defendants filed the motion that lies
at the center of this Article-a Consented-To Motion to Maintain
Settlement Documents Under Seal.3 4 The motion sought a court
order to seal
all documents related to the settlement of the
Litigation including, but not limited to, the Stipulation
of Settlement and accompanying exhibits, the Joint
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement and
accompanying Memorandum of Law in Support, all
orders regarding the settlement entered by this Court,
transcripts of hearings regarding the settlement, and
any objections to the settlement filed by class
members ... .35

01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2010), ECF No. 138 [hereinafter Joint Status
Report].
31. Id. at 1-2.
32. Status Conference Before Judge David Stewart Cercone at 2, Hirschfield
v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2011), ECF No.
141 [hereinafter Status Conference]. The brief record of the conference does not
explain what is meant by "waiver of rights to opt out."
33. Id.
34. Consented-To Motion, supra note 2.
35. Id. at 2. The proposed settlement encompassed the three class actions
then pending in federal district court, see supra note 5, as well as a related case
pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. See Consented-To
Motion, supra note 2, at I (defining the "Litigation"). Defendants filed identical
motions seeking orders sealing the settlement documents in the Hartman and PNC
Bank class actions, and the plaintiffs consented to entry of the proposed orders.
Consented-To Motion to Maintain Settlement Docs. Under Seal, Hartman v.
Levin, No. 2:10-cv-00029-DSC (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2011), ECF No. 107;
Consented-To Motion to Maintain Settlement Docs. Under Seal, PNC Bank v.
B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:10-cv-00649-DSC (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2011), ECF No. 39.
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The motion stated that the plaintiffs consented to the entry of the
proposed order. 36 The defendants' brief in support of the motion
argued that the settlement terms were not "material" to any members
of the general public other than the class members and that the
defendants were not public officials or entities. 37 It assured the court
that "all named plaintiffs in the Litigation will be provided every
Settlement Document in connection with effectuating the
settlement[,] and all other, unnamed class members will have access
to all Settlement Documents through the Claims Administrators in
charge of administering the settlement." 38 Thus, the brief suggested
that general public interest in the case was low and that the proposed
order would not deny access to anyone with a legitimate need for
information regarding the settlement. On the other hand, the need
for confidentiality was high, the brief posited, because
disclosure of the Settlement Documents would cause
embarrassment and serious injury to the Defendants,
many of whom have devoted significant time and
effort to charitable work and community projects for
years. The settlement may damage the Defendants'
reputations and result in a public misperception
regarding their work and focus. In particular, any
public misperception that detracts from several of the
Defendants' important charitable work across the
world would cause them, and those they serve,
serious injury. 39
Finally, the brief invoked "the strong public interest in promoting
settlement, especially where, as in the present case, prospective
confidentiality facilitated the settlement." 40
Just four days after the motion was filed (and apparently
without an evidentiary hearing or even an oral argument), the court
signed the order, granting the parties "leave to submit all documents
36. Consented-To Motion, supra note 2, at 2.
37. Memorandum of Law in Support of Consented-To Motion to Maintain
Settlement Documents Under Seal at 5, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2011), ECF No. 143 [hereinafter Memorandum
in Support].
38. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 5-6.
40. Id. at 6.
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that refer to the amount of the settlement . . . under seal" and
directing the Clerk of Court "to file and maintain under seal all
documents that refer to the amount of the settlement . . . ."1 The
order, which was unaccompanied by a judicial opinion, applied not
only to the stipulation of settlement and all accompanying exhibits
(including the order preliminarily approving the settlement, the
notice of proposed settlement and fairness hearing, the summary
notice, the proof of claim and release form, and the order and final
judgment), but also to the joint motion for preliminary approval of
the settlement and brief in support thereof, all orders regarding the
settlement, all transcripts of hearings regarding the settlement, and
any objections filed by class members.4 2 Even the federal and state
officials to whom notices of the proposed class action settlement had
to be sent under the Class Action Fairness Act 43 were ordered to
maintain them as confidential.4
A brief flurry of sealed filings followed, including,
apparently, a Stipulation of Settlement4 5 and a joint request "that the
Court enter a preliminary order approving settlement, providing
notice and certifying a class for settlement purposes."4 6 An order
was entered under seal on April 6, 2011, presumably granting
preliminary approval of the settlement and certifying a class for
settlement purposes. 4 7 The public record fails to disclose what
materials, if any, were mailed to the absent class members and how
41. Order of Court at 1, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l at 1, No. 2:09-cv01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2011), ECF No. 144 [hereinafter Order of Court].
42. Id. at 1-2.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (2006).
44. Order of Court, supra note 41, at 2.
45. Sealed Document, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535DSC (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2011), ECF No. 147. A later-filed motion identified this
sealed document as a Stipulation of Settlement. Motion for Miscellaneous Relief
at 2, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31,
2011), ECF No. 150 [hereinafter Motion to Withdraw] (re-docketed as Motion to
Withdraw Motion to Certify Class).
46. See id. 14 (describing relief sought in a sealed filing). To avoid any risk
of confusion regarding the definition of the class and the motion to certify before
the court, the plaintiffs moved, unopposed, to withdraw their earlier motion for
class certification, filed more than a year earlier, upon which the court had not yet
ruled. Id. 1 5. The court granted the Motion to Withdraw the day after it was filed.
Order of Court, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D.
Pa. Apr. 4, 2011), ECF No. 151.
47. Sealed Order, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC
(W.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2011), ECF No. 152.
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the Claims Administrator provided them with access to the
documents if absent class members requested them. Two additional
motions were filed under seal on July 27, 201148 accompanied by
four separately-filed sealed documents. 4 9 The contents of these
motions and documents cannot be discerned from the public record.
An entry on the docket sheet on August 10, 2011 noted that a "Joint
Motion for Final Approval of Settlement and Plaintiffs' Counsel's
Application for Award of Attorney Fees were granted by the Court.
Orders to follow." 5 0 Two orders, filed under seal, were issued the
following daZ 5 1 and the status code, "Closed," was added to the
docket sheet.
Covenant's bankruptcy and the litigation against B'nai B'rith
that followed had garnered significant media attention, not only in
both of Pittsburgh's daily newspapers 53 and its local Jewish
weekly,5 4 but also in the national press.
The case had even been
48. Sealed Motion by All Plaintiffs, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No.
2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. July 27, 2011), ECF No. 153; Sealed Motion by
Dean and Melva Hirschfield, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535DSC (W.D. Pa. July 27, 2011), ECF No. 155.
49. Sealed Document by All Plaintiffs, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No.
2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. July 27, 2011), ECF No. 154; Sealed Document by
Dean Hirschfield, Melva Hirschfield, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. July 27, 2011), ECF No. 156; Sealed Document by Dean
Hirschfield, Melva Hirschfield, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. July 27, 2011), ECF No. 157; Sealed Document by Dean
Hirschfield, Melva Hirschfield, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv01 535-DSC (W.D. Pa. July 27, 2011), ECF No. 158.
50. Motion Hearing Before Judge David Stewart Cercone, Hirschfield v.
B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2011), ECF No.
159.
51. Sealed Order, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC
(W.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2011), ECF No. 160; Sealed Order, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith
Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2011), ECF No. 161.
52. Civil Docket, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC
(W.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2011).
53. See Chris Ramirez, Protectionfor Seniors from Bad Real Estate Deals
Urged, PITT. TRIB.-REV. (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/
pittsburghtrib/s_702569.html (focusing on seniors who had lost a combined $26
million when Covenant declared bankruptcy); Paula Reed Ward, Sale of Bankrupt
Mt. Lebanon Facility Delayed, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, July 30, 2009, at S-4,
available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09211/987305-55.stm (reporting on
delay of sale of Covenant because of financing difficulties).
54. See Toby Tabachnick, Convenant [sic] Residents Could Recover Partial
Deposits in Suit, JEWISH CHRON. (Dec. 9, 2010), http://thejewishchronicle.net
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the subject of testimony before the United States Senate Special
Committee on Aging. 56 Notwithstanding the public interest in the
case, the court-ordered secrecy surrounding the settlement denied the
public and press any and all information regarding its ultimate
resolution.
The B'nai B'rith litigation was the first secret class action
settlement of which I was aware. In the next section, I seek to
determine whether the case was singular or part of a broader, if
hidden, practice.

III.

SCOPE OF THE PRACTICE

By their very nature, settlements filed under seal are shielded
from the public eye, and therefore it is difficult to discern the scope
I took two steps to gain a preliminary
of the practice.
understanding of the incidence of secret class action settlements.
First, I searched online for newspaper articles regarding class action
settlements filed under seal. Second, I undertook a modest empirical
study, examining all of the class actions filed in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania during a
twenty-year period to determine the number and percentage of class
action settlements that were filed under seal. 5 8 Neither step revealed
/view/full story/10593506/article-Convenant-residents-could-recover-partialdeposits-in-suit (detailing agreement with confidential specific terms, which would
enable former residents to recover some funds) (last visited Mar. 24, 2012).
55. See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, Concerns Rise About Continuing-Care
Enclaves, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, at F5, available at 2010 WLNR 18348669
(highlighting the entrance fees paid by residents of the Covenant at South Hills and
the financial risks assumed).
56. Continuing Care Retirement Communities (CCRCs): Secure Retirement
or Risky Investment?: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 111th Cong.
29 (2010) (statement of Charles Prine).
57. See David A. Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Secret Settlements and Practice
Restrictions Aid Lawyer Cartels and Cause Other Harms, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
1217, 1218 (noting that it is difficult to gauge the incidence of secret settlements
because they "are by definition secret" and adding that "[e]mpirical data on the
frequency of these practices is . . . unreliable"); David Luban, Settlements and the

Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2650 (1995) (noting that "the
extent of secret settlements . . is purely conjectural (how could it be
otherwise?)").
58. In both of these efforts, I relied heavily on work performed by my
research assistant, Ian Everhart.
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a single case in which a court had shielded from the public eye the
settlement of a Rule 23 class action, but both identified a greater
willingness on the part of courts to seal settlements in collective
actions filed under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
A.

Secret Class Action Settlements in the News

A WestlawNext search of the News database turned up a
smattering of newspaper stories about secret settlements in cases
filed as class actions. This undertaking was somewhat frustrating,
however, as the underlying litigation papers for a number of the
cases described in newspapers could not be located. Moreover, upon
closer examination of the litigation papers that were available, some
of the cases discussed in the news involved secret settlements of
putative class actions in which no motion for class certification was
ever made or in which a certification order was later withdrawn.
For example, in one putative class action filed on behalf of
dog owners who purchased allegedly defective dog treats, 5 the
parties reached a settlement before certification, but did not present it
to the court for its approval. Instead, after agreeing to keep the terms
of the settlement confidential, 60 the parties filed a Stipulation of
Dismissal with Prejudice 61 and the court entered an Order of
Dismissal.62
59. The original class action complaint was filed in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, Class Action Complaint, Glass v.
S&M NuTec, LLC, No. 7:06-CV-01534-WCC (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2006), ECF No.
1, but the case was later transferred to the Western District of Missouri. See
Opinion & Order, Glass v. S&M NuTec, LLC, No. 7:06-CV-01534-WCC
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2006), ECF No. 19 (explaining that the action could have been
filed in the Western District of Missouri). See also Opinion & Order, Glass v.
S&M NuTec, LLC, No. 06-00853-CV-W-GAF (W.D. Mo. Oct. 16, 2006), ECF
No. 20 (transferring case to the Western District of Missouri); Civil Docket for
Case No. 4:06-CV-00853-GAF, Glass v. S&M NuTec, LLC, No. 06-cv-00853GAF (W.D. Mo. 2006) (listing transfer order as first entry on docket sheet in
transferee court).
60. See S&M NuTec Settles Greenies Class Action, KANSAS CITY Bus. J.,
Sept. 17, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 18201820 (stating that the settlement
terms were "private").
61. Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, Glass v. S&M NuTec, LLC, No.
06-0853-CV-W-GAF (W.D. Mo. Sept. 14, 2007), ECF No. 147.
62. Order of Dismissal, Glass v. S&M NuTec, LLC, No. 06-0853-CV-WGAF (W.D. Mo. Sept. 17, 2007), ECF No. 148.
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In another putative class action, one filed on behalf of actors,
writers and producers against all of the major movie studios, the
court certified a class and approved a notice to be disseminated to the
absentees, 63 but then, nearly two years later, vacated the certification
order. 64 When the named plaintiffs and Warner Brothers later
reached a confidential settlement,65 the court entered a stipulation
and order dismissing the complaint with prejudice.6 6
This avenue-voluntarily dismissing with no judicial review
of the settlement-is an option only if the court has not yet certified
a class or has vacated its certification order. 67 In such cases, the
settlement binds only the named parties and not the absent class
members, so these cases are not really class actions at all. They are
nevertheless worth mentioning because they were filed as class
actions and may have had some effects on the absentees, such as
tolling the statute of limitations on their claims 6 8 and lulling them
63. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Class
Certification, Garrison v. Warner Bros., Inc., No. 95-CV-08328-RMT-SH (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 29, 1996), ECF No. 74; Stipulation and Order That the Notice of
Pendency of Class Action Is Appropriate for Dissemination to the Members of the
Class, Garrison v. Warner Bros., Inc., No. 95-CV-08328-RMT-SH (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 19, 1997), ECF No. 101. While the docket sheet for Garrisonis available on
both Bloomberg Law and Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER),
neither database provides access to the underlying documents (presumably because
of the date of the litigation). The description of the case is gleaned solely from
entries on the docket sheet and one news story. David Robb, Family Settles Suit
Filed over "JFK" Profits, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 12, 1999, at B6,
available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1683&dat=19990412&id=
(last visited Mar.
b6gaAAAAIBAJ&sjid=IToEAAAAIBAJ&pg-5420,5796956
12, 2012).
64. Order [Vacating Prior Order Granting Class Certification], Garrison v.
Warner Bros., Inc., No. 95-CV-08328-RMT-SH (C.D. Cal. May 26, 1998), ECF
No. 152.
65. Robb, supra note 63, at B6 (stating that "[t]erms of the settlement are
confidential").
66. Stipulation & Order, Garrison v. Warner Bros., Inc., No. 95-CV-08328RMT-SH (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1999), ECF No. 172.
67. According to the docket sheet in Glass, no motion to certify was ever
filed, although a scheduling order that contemplated class certification was
entered. See Scheduling Order at 1, Glass v. S&M NuTec, LLC, No. 06-CV-0853W-GAF (W.D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2007), ECF No. 54 (stating that "the initial stage of
this litigation shall focus exclusively on class certification discovery").
68. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974) ("[T]he
commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to
all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been
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into believing that the named representatives and their attorney were
looking out for the absentees' interests. In fact, until a 2003
amendment of Rule 23(e) clarified that judicial approval is required
only with respect to certified class actions, some courts read the rule
"to require court approval of settlements with putative class
representatives that resolved only individual claims."6 9
A second group of newspaper stories involved confidential
settlements in collective actions filed under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA" or the "Act").7 0
For example, in Hammond v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc.,
plaintiffs filed a putative class action on behalf of all employees of
Lowe's Home Centers seeking unpaid overtime compensation and
unpaid minimum wage compensation under the FLSA. 7 1 The court
72
conditionally certified a class under section 216(b) of the FLSA,
which permits certain actions under the statute to be maintained "by
any one or more of the employees for and in behalf of himself or
themselves and other employees similarly situated." 73 Following
mediation, the parties jointly moved to file a confidential settlement

permitted to continue as a class action."). See also Rhonda Wasserman, Tolling:
The American Pipe Tolling Rule and Successive Class Actions, 58 FLA. L. REV.
803, 805 (2006) ("[T]he statute of limitations is tolled from the date of filing of the
class action complaint until denial of the motion to certify.").
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A), Committee Notes on Rules-2003
Amendment (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.41 (1995)).
See also Crawford v. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 267 F.3d 760, 764-65 (8th Cir.
2001) (stating that judicial approval is required "even if a class has not yet been
certified" because "[d]ismissal might prejudice potential members whose claims
have expired under a statute of limitations . . . . [or] potential members who have
been relying on the named plaintiff to protect their interests . . ).

70. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 216 (2006) (providing a private right of action to
recover damages for violations of the Act's overtime provisions).
71. Plaintiffs' 216(b) Motion to Certify Representative Action and Approve
Notice to Class Members, Hammond v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 2:02-cv02509-CM-GLR (D. Kan. Dec. 15, 2004), ECF No. 136. The court denied one
motion and struck a second motion submitted by plaintiffs to certify a class under
Rule 23 for purposes of related state contract claims. Memorandum and Order,
Hammond v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 2:02-CV-02509-CM-GLR (D. Kan.
Sept. 1, 2005), ECF No. 187; Order, Hammond v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., No.
2:02-cv-02509-CM-GLR (D. Kan. Feb. 6, 2006), ECF No. 225.
72. Memorandum and Order at 8, Hammond v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., No.
2:02-cv-02509-CM-GLR (D. Kan. Sept. 1, 2005), ECF No. 187.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
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agreement under seal.74 The court granted the motion the very day it
was filed, permitting the parties to file the settlement agreement
under seal and ordering that it "shall remain SEALED."7 ' The
parties did so on the same day 76 (it was a busy day in Kansas City!),
and just one week later, the court approved the confidential
settlement agreement.7 7
In another FLSA case, Dernovish v. AT&T Operations, Inc.,
plaintiffs who provided telephone customer assistance sought
compensation for the time they spent logging into telephone and
computer systems before their paid shifts began. 78 The court
conditionally certified a collective action (over defendant's
opposition), 79 and a year later, following discovery, discoveryrelated litigation, and mediation, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed
motion for approval of a settlement. The Settlement Agreement
itself was submitted to the court in camera.81 The Court entered an
order, scheduling a hearing and raising several concerns about the
proposed settlement, including its confidentiality provisions:
[T]he Court is troubled by the settlement agreement's
First, it calls for
confidentiality provisions.
confidentiality regarding matters that are already in
74. Parties' Joint Motion to File Confidential Settlement Agreement Under
Seal, Hammond v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 2:02-cv-02509-CM-GLR (D.
Kan. Sept. 22, 2006), ECF No. 239; Memorandum in Support of Parties' Joint
Motion to File Confidential Settlement Agreement Under Seal, Hammond v.
Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 2:02-cv-02509-CM-GLR (D. Kan. Sept. 22, 2006), ECF
No. 240.
75. Order, Hammond v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 2:02-cv-02509-CMGLR (D. Kan. Sept. 22, 2006), ECF No. 241.
76. Parties' Joint Motion to File Confidential Settlement Agreement Under
Seal, Hammond v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 2:02-cv-02509-CM-GLR (D.
Kan. Sept. 22, 2006), ECF No. 239.
77. Order Approving Settlement Agreement, Hammond v. Lowe's Home
Ctrs., Inc., No. 2:02-cv-02509-CM-GLR (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2006), ECF No. 245.
78. Dernovish v. AT&T Operations, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1087 (W.D.
Mo. 2010).
79. Order and Opinion Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Conditionally Certify
Collective Action, Dernovish v. AT&T Operations, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-00015-ODS
(W.D. Mo. Jan. 12,2010), ECF No. 95.
80. Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Approval of Collective Action
Settlement and Attorney Fees with Memorandum in Support, Dernovish v. AT&T
Operations, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-0015-ODS (W.D. Mo. Jan. 7, 2011), ECF No. 281.
81. See id. at I (stating that the agreement has been submitted in camera).
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the public record (e.g., "all allegations in the Lawsuit"
and, apparently, the existence of the settlement).
Second, it purports to impose liability on each class
member should they disclose or discuss the
settlement. Third, and most importantly, the Court is
not convinced that a confidentiality provision in this
case serves the public interest. The provision does
not protect trade secrets, proprietary information,
financial information, or other information that is
While Defendant
normally entitled to secrecy.
understandably wants to avoid adverse publicity, the
Court has not been persuaded that it-or the classshould be complicit in effectuating this desire.82
In light of this concern, the defendant filed a supplemental
brief in support of the motion, stating that the parties proposed to
limit the scope of the confidentiality provision "to maintain the
confidentiality only of the financial terms of the agreement." 83
Following a hearing on the settlement, the defendant moved to seal a
portion of the transcript, which revealed "the amount of attorney fees
sought and the percentage of the settlement fund to be apportioned to
attorney fees . . . ."84 The court granted the motion to seal the
portion of the transcript 5 and ap roved the settlement, including the
limited confidentiality provision. 6 The court's order did not explain
how or whether the parties had assuaged the judge's concern that the
confidentiality provision did not serve the public interest. 87
82. Order Setting Hearing on Motion for Approval of Settlement at 2,
Dernovish v. AT&T Operations, Inc., 4:09-cv-00015-ODS (W.D. Mo. Jan. 1,
2011), ECF No. 282. The court also expressed concern regarding the lack of
information needed to assess the fairness of the settlement. Id. at 1.
83. AT&T's Unopposed Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for
Approval of Collective Action Settlement at 1, Dernovish v. AT&T Operations,
Inc., 4:09-cv-0015-ODS (W.D. Mo. Jan. 26, 2011), ECF No. 283.
84. Defendant's Motion to Seal Portion of Jan. 27, 2011 Transcript of
Hearing at 1, Dernovish v. AT&T Operations, Inc., 4:09-cv-00015-ODS (W.D.
Mo. Jan. 27, 2011), ECF No. 286.
85. Order Granting Motion to Seal Portion of Transcript, Dernovish v. AT&T
Operations, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-00015-ODS (W.D. Mo. Feb. 7, 2011), ECF No. 287.
86. Order Approving Collective Action Settlement, Dernovish v. AT&T
Operations, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-0015-ODS (W.D. Mo. Feb. 7, 2011), ECF No. 288.
87. Scott Lauck, Despite Misgivings, a Federal Judge Approved a
Confidential Settlement in a Class Action Lawsuit Against AT&T, MO. LAW.
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In sum, my first effort to ascertain the scope of secret class
action settlement, through the examination of news stories in
Westlaw, yielded just two cases, which in and of itself is noteworthy.
The study identified no class actions filed under Rule 23 that had
been settled confidentially (or at least none that could be confirmed);
the two class actions settled under seal that could be confirmed were
both FLSA collective actions.
Two additional points should be emphasized. First, just as
Rule 23 class actions may not be voluntarily dismissed or settled
without judicial approval, claims under the FLSA may not be settled
or compromised unless the Department of Labor supervises the
settlement or a court approves a settlement in the context of an
That judicial approval of
adversarial action filed under § 216(b).
an FLSA settlement is required renders the sealing of the settlements
in Lowe's and Dernovish noteworthy given the public interest in
monitoring the judiciary's performance of this duty 89 and the
obstacles the public faces if it lacks access to the agreement under
review.
Second, since collective actions under § 216(b , of the FLSA
bind only those employees who affirmatively opt in, 0 the "absent"
MEDIA, Mar. 27, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 6419278.
88. See, e.g., Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 135253, 1355 (1lth Cir. 1982) (noting that the Department of Labor must supervise the
settlement) (citing Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108 (1946) and Brooklyn Say.
Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945)); Stalnaker v. Novar Corp., 293 F. Supp. 2d
1260, 1262 (M.D. Ala. 2003) ("In reviewing a settlement of an FLSA private
claim, a court must 'scrutiniz[e] the settlement of fairness,' and determine that the
settlement is a 'fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA

provisions."' (citing Lynn's Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1353, 1355)); Boone v. City
of Suffolk, 79 F. Supp. 2d 603, 605, 605 n.2 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("[E]mployees
cannot waive their right to overtime wages unless such a settlement is overseen by
the Department of Labor or approved for fairness and reasonableness by a district
court." (citing Lynn's Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1355)). But see Martinez v. Bohls
Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608, 631 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that
"parties may reach private compromises as to FLSA claims where there is a bona
fide dispute as to the amount of hours worked or compensation due").
89. See, e.g., Boone, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 609 ("[I]n an FLSA action, where
federal law requires court approval for fairness before any settlement can be
executed, the public has an interest in determining whether the Court is properly
fulfilling its duties when it approves a back-wages settlement agreement."). See
also infra Part IV.A (identifying the policies supporting public access to settlement
agreements).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). See also Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling,
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employees in a collective action are not quite as removed from the
proceedings and the lawyer representing the class as absent class
members in a Rule 23 class action. Therefore, the policies implicated
in the FLSA secret settlements may not be identical to those in Rule
23 class actions, a matter that we will take up in Part IV. First,
however, let us consider a somewhat more scientific effort to gauge
the incidence of secret class action settlements.
B.

Scope ofPracticein One FederalJudicialDistrict

In undertaking a modest empirical study of the incidence of
secret class action settlements, I solicited the assistance of the Clerk
of Court of the United States District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania, Robert V. Barth, Jr. Searching the court's records
electronically, Mr. Barth identified ninety-four cases filed between
June 1991 and June 2011 in which a motion to certify a class was
granted. 9 1 Running a different query, he identified 168 additional
cases filed during the same period, which were designated as class
actions on the civil cover sheet but in which a motion for class
certification was denied (152 of the 168) or in which no motion to
certify a class was ever filed or decided (16 of the 168).92 Thus, a
total of 262 cases were filed as class actions in the district between
June 1991 and June 2011.
Interestingly, the case that first provoked my attention,
493 U.S. 165, 168-69 (1989) (discussing the process whereby employees
affirmatively consent in writing to become parties to an ADEA or FLSA collective
action). For a critical assessment of the FLSA's opt-in requirement, see Craig
Becker & Paul Strauss, Representing Low-Wage Workers in the Absence of a
Class: The PeculiarCase of Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Underenforcement of Minimum Labor Standards, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1321
(2008).
91. E-mail from Robert V. Barth, Jr., Clerk of the Court, U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania, to author (June 22, 2011) (on file with
author and THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION) (containing a report of cases for which a
motion for class certification was granted). This list of cases included both Rule
23 class actions and FLSA collective actions.
92. See id (containing a report of cases for which motion for class
certification was denied, or in which no motion was presented). Section VII of the
Civil Cover Sheet requires an attorney filing an action in federal court to indicate
"if this is a class action under F.R.C.P. 23." JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
JS 44 CIVIL COVER SHEET, available at http://www.uscourts.gov
/uscourts/FormsAndFees/Forms/JS044.pdf (emphasis in original).
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Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rithInternational,was included on the second
list-those in which motions to certify were denied or never filed or
decided. While I believe the court granted a motion to certify a
settlement class (at least preliminarily) in April 201 1,93 the order
was filed under seal, so I cannot confirm my belief. If such an order
was granted in April, it may not have been "counted" as a grant of a
motion to certify either because it was filed under seal or because it
was only a preliminary grant. The order that finally approved the
settlement and presumably finally certified the settlement class was
entered and filed under seal on August 11, 2011, after the June 2011
cut-off date for this study. 94
In all events, my research assistant and I focused on the
ninety-four cases flagged as certified class actions and sought to
determine how many, if any, had been settled under seal. First, we
sought to confirm, through analysis of docket sheets and public
filings, 95 that motions to certify a class had in fact been granted in all
ninety-four cases. In eleven of the ninety-four cases, we were unable
to find a motion to certify a class or an order granting such a motion
on the docket sheet and therefore omitted these eleven cases from
our analysis. One additional case was omitted due to the lack of
online access to its documents. 9 6
Of the eighty-two remaining cases in which a class
certification order had been entered, fifteen were still pending as of
September 1, 2011, and these cases were also excluded from our
analysis (because a settlement might be filed under seal in the
future). Of the remaining sixty-seven closed cases in which a class
had been certified, three, or 4.5%, contained orders granting leave to
file a class-wide settlement agreement under seal. 97 All three of
93. Sealed Order, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC
(W.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2011), ECF No. 152.
94. Sealed Order, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC
(W.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2011), ECF No. 160; Sealed Order, Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith
Int'l, No. 2:09-cv-01535-DSC (W.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2011), ECF No. 161. See also
supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (discussing the order approving the
settlement).
95. We searched the Bloomberg Law docket database and occasionally
conducted follow-up searches on PACER.
96. Zuleg v. Ratner, No. 92-cv-01 165 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 1992).
97. Order to Seal, Nawojski v. First Advantage Litig. Consulting, No. 2:09cv-00544-DSC (W.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2010), ECF No. 22; Order to Seal, Abercrombie
v. Pressley Ridge, No. 2:09-cv-00468-AJS (W.D. Pa. July 19, 2010), ECF No. 92.
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these cases involved FLSA collective actions with opt-in classes. 98
These figures are summarized below in Table 1.
Table 1.
Class actions in which
a motion to certify was
granted
94

Docket sheet
did not reveal

11

order to certify

On-line access
unavailable
Remaining

1
82

cases

Still pending
as of 9/1/11
Total closed
cases in which
a motion to
certify was
granted
Class actions
filed under seal
Percentage

15

67

filed under seal

Three points deserve special mention. First, this study
reinforces the principal finding of the Westlaw study: courts are
disinclined to seal settlements in Rule 23 class actions, while they
occasionally do so in collective actions filed under the FLSA.
Unlike employees in FLSA cases, who are bound only if they
affirmatively opt in, Rule 23 absent class members are bound by the
class action judgment unless they opt out and have little, if any,
See also Status Conference Before: Magistrate Judge Robert C. Mitchell, Bishop v.
AT&T Corp., No. 2:08-cv-00468-RCM (W.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2010), ECF No. 243
(documenting, in a minute entry, court's grant at status conference of joint oral
motion to file joint stipulation of settlement under seal).
98. Complaint, Nawojski v. First Advantage Litig. Consulting, No. 2:09-cv00544-DSC (W.D. Pa. May 5, 2009), ECF No. 1; Complaint, Abercrombie v.
Pressley Ridge, No. 2:09-cv-00468-AJS (W.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2009), ECF No. 1;
Complaint, Bishop v. AT&T Corp., No. 2:08-cv-00468-RCM (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9,
2008), ECF No. 1.
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contact with the attorney charged with representing their interests. 99
As a result, courts in Rule 23 class actions have a unique obligation
to protect the interests of absent class members, which may explain
judicial reticence to seal class action settlements. This point will be
more fully developed in Part IV.
Second, a national study by the Federal Judicial Center
("FJC") of settlement agreements filed under seal for the two-year
period 2001-02 puts these local statistics into perspective. The FJC
study revealed that only 0.44% of the 288,846 civil cases examined
(not exclusively class actions) involved settlements filed under
sealloo and an even smaller percentage, 0.26%, of cases examined by
the FJC from the Western District of Pennsylvania involved
settlements filed under seal during the 2001-02 period.' 0 These tiny
percentages suggest that among parties that settle their claims, the
vast majority decline to file their agreements in court or seek judicial
approval. Thus, the 0.44% percentage tells us nothing about the
percentage of all civil cases that settled secretly; it tells us only that a
tiny percentage involved settlements filed under seal.
In Rule 23 class actions and FLSA collective actions, parties
do not have the freedom to settle their cases without judicial
approval.102 Since settlements in FLSA collective actions and Rule
23 class actions must be judicially approved, they are frequently
filed.103 Accordingly, class actions and collective actions that are
settled confidentially will often (if not invariably) involve a
settlement that is filed under seal. Thus, it is not surprising that of all
settlements filed under seal, a sizeable fraction involve cases in
99. See John Bronsteen, Class Action Settlements: An Opt-in Proposal,2005
U. ILL. L. REV. 903, 908-09 (2005) (noting potential pitfalls of the opt-out nature
of Rule 23).
100. ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SEALED
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS INFEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 1, 3, A-2 (2004) (stating
that "a sealed settlement agreement is filed in less than one-half of one percent of
civil cases," identifying a rate of 0.44% for all civil cases, and examining cases
that were terminated in 2001 and 2002).
101. Id. at4, Figure 1.
102. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e) ("The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified
class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the courts'
approval"). See also Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454, 460 (4th Cir.
2007) ("[T]here is a judicial prohibition against the unsupervised waiver or
settlement of claims" under the FLSA) (citing P.A. Schultz, Inc. v. Gangi, 328
U.S. 108, 114-16 (1946)).
103. REAGAN ET AL., supra note 100, at 3, 5.
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which the parties were required to seek judicial approval. According
to the FJC study, "almost one-quarter (22%) [of the actions in which
settlement agreements were filed under seal] were actions typically
requiring court approval of settlement agreements," including cases
involving minors and others requiring special protection (13%),
FLSA actions (7%) and class actions (6%). 104 Nor is it surprising
that the sealed settlement rate in my local study of class actions
(4.5%) is ten times hi her than the general sealed settlement rate for
civil cases (0.44%)10 and seventeen times higher than the general
sealed settlement rate for civil cases in the Western District of
Pennsylvania for the 2001-02 period (0.26%).1o6
Finally, it is worth noting that the 4.5% sealed settlement rate
in my local class action study is markedly higher than the sealed
settlement rate for FLSA actions in the FJC study (2.6%).107 This
difference is surprising since the FJC study distinguished between
Rule 23 class actions, on the one hand, and FLSA cases, on the
other, whereas in our study, the list of certified class actions from
which we worked contained both Rule 23 and FLSA class actions.ios
Since courts appear more reticent to seal settlements in Rule 23 class
actions, we would have expected our (combined Rule 23 and FLSA)
sealed settlement rate to have been lower than the FLSA sealed
settlement rate found in the FJC study.
In conclusion, while secret class action settlements are not
unheard of-the FJC study found that 6% of settlements filed under
seal involved class actions 109-both my Westlaw study and the
modest empirical study of class actions filed in the Western District
of Pennsylvania suggest that the practice is quite uncommon. Before
turning to the legal, logistical, and policy-based constraints that help
explain judicial reluctance to seal class action settlements, let us
examine the swirl of competing policies surrounding the broader
debate over sealed settlements in general.

104. Id. at 5. The percentages add up to more than 22% because some cases
fell into more than one category. Id at 5 n.8.
105. Id. at 3.
106. Id. at 4, Figure 1.
107. Id. at 3.
108. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (examining cases that
involved both Rule 23 and FLSA class actions).
109. REAGAN ET AL., supra note 100, at 5.
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SECRECY AND ACCESS IN CONTEXT

In this broader debate, courts have been called upon to issue
confidentiality orders to shield settlements from public scrutiny, on
the one hand, and to grant public access to settlements previously
filed under seal, on the other, while lawmakers and rules committees
have debated and occasionally enacted restrictions on judicial
authority to seal settlements. 1 0 We will outline the contours of this
debate and the clash of competing policies at issue.
A.

Policies FavoringPublicAccess to Settlement
Agreements

Let us begin by identifying those policies that support public
access to settlement agreements that are filed and presented to courts
for judicial approval. Parties may seek judicial approval of a
negotiated settlement because they anticipate a need for judicial
enforcement' 11 or because the law requires it.1 12 Once presented to a
110. See S. 623, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (mentioning that the proposed
Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2011 would limit judicial authority to approve
settlements that would shield from public scrutiny information "relevant to the
protection of public health or safety"). See also D.S.C. LOCAL CIv. R. 5.03(E)
(providing that "[n]o settlement agreement filed with the Court shall be sealed
pursuant to the terms of this Rule"); TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a (presuming that court
records, including settlement agreements, are "open to the general public" and
stating that such records may be sealed only upon a showing "a specific, serious
and substantial interest" that "clearly outweighs" (1) the "presumption of
openness" and (2) "any probable adverse effect that sealing will have upon the
general public health or safety"); REAGAN ET AL., supra note 100, at 2-3, App. B
(describing local rules of federal district courts that address sealed documents). In
September 2011, the Judicial Conference of the United States issued a policy
limiting the circumstances in which entire civil case files may be sealed. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE POLICY ON SEALED
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/201 1/docs/
at
available
CASES,

For a study of this
JudicialConferencePolicyOnSealedCivilCases20 11.pdf.
practice, see FED. JUD. CENTER, SEALED CASES IN FEDERAL COURTS (Oct. 23,
2009).
111. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse
Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that parties filed their settlement
agreement in anticipation that they would "disagree on the terms and would want
recourse to the court"). See also REAGAN ET AL., supra note 100, at 5; Laurie
Kratky Dor6, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the
Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 283, 388-89, 394 (1999) (stating
that "litigants who rely exclusively on contractual confidentiality provisions
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court for its approval, a settlement agreement becomes part of the
judicial recordl 3 and the court's ruling on the settlement "directly
affect[s] an adjudication." 1 l 4 The court's approval or rejection of the
settlement determines the outcome of the case and the parties'
substantive rights.1 15
In these cases, public access to the settlement agreement and
public monitoring of the judicial proceedings held to review it serve
a variety of related policy objectives. First, public access helps
ensure that the documents and testimony submitted to the court and
upon which it relies are truthful and accurate.1 1 6 As the Third Circuit
potentially limit their enforcement options" and that "litigants presumably do not
file their agreement unless they want the court to take some action conceming it");
Anne-Th6rbse B6champs, Note, Sealed Out-of-Court Settlements: When Does the
Public Have a Right to Know?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 117, 119 (1990) (stating
that parties frequently opt to file agreements "in order to obtain a consent decree
that will enable them to enforce the agreement by use of the court's contempt
power without filing an entirely new lawsuit").
112. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (stating that a certified class action may be
settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court's approval).
See also D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 113 n.8 (1946) (concluding
that the FLSA bars private settlements of wage claims, but appearing to sanction
stipulated judgments because of "the requirement of pleading the issues and
submitting the judgment to judicial scrutiny"); REAGAN ET AL., supra note 100, at
5 (noting that almost one quarter of cases with sealed settlement agreements were
in actions in which judicial approval of a settlement was required).
113. See Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that the
agreement was submitted to and approved by the judge and a copy was deposited
in the files of the court and then ordered sealed); Rittenhouse, 800 F.2d at 343-44
(stating that a "motion or a settlement agreement filed with the court is a public
component of a civil trial"); Stalnaker v. Norvar Corp., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1260,
1263 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (stating that when a settlement is approved by a court, the
settlement becomes part of the judicial record). Dord provides a more thorough
discussion of the documents that qualify as judicial records. Dord, supra note 111,
at 374-78.
114. United States v. Amodeo (Amodeo 11), 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir.
1995); Stalnaker,293 F. Supp. 2d at 1264 (citing Amodeo II).
115. See Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049 (noting that "the strong weight to be
accorded the public right of access to judicial documents was largely derived from
the role those documents played in determining litigants' substantive rightsconduct at the heart of Article III-and from the need for public monitoring of that
conduct").
116. See In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that
the right of access strengthens confidence in the courts); Littlejohn v. BIC Corp.,
851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that public access "enhanc[es]
testimonial trustworthiness and the quality of justice dispensed by the court")
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put it, "the bright light cast upon the judicial process by public
observation diminishes possibilities for . . . perjury and fraud."

17

Public access to judicial proceedings may even "induce unknown
witnesses to come forward with relevant testimony."i1s
to
settlement agreements
Second, public access
and the judicial proceedings held in connection with their
monitor
judicial
enforcement
helps
approval
or
performance. 119 "Monitoring both provides judges with critical
views of their work and deters arbitrary judicial behavior." 20
In other words, if the public is afforded access to settlement
agreements and the judicial proceedings held to review them, the
public can provide feedback to judges on their performance. To the
extent judges seek to avoid negative feedback, monitoring promotes
careful and scrupulous judicial work.121 These monitoring functions
(citation omitted). See also Judith Resnik, Courts: In and out of Sight, Site and
Cite, 53 VILL. L. REv. 771, 784 (2008) (discussing Jeremy Bentham's belief that
"public adjudication produced more accurate decisions").
117. Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 678 (not a settlement case).
118. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979). Accord Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1178 (6th Cir. 1983)
(asserting that open trials promote "true and accurate fact finding" and "when
information is disseminated to the public through the media, previously
unidentified witnesses may come forward with evidence").
119. See, e.g., Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting
that "the public cannot monitor judicial performance adequately if the records of
judicial proceedings are secret"); Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1048 (noting a
presumption of access to hold judges accountable and to instill public confidence
in the administration of justice); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel
Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 345 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that public access
to a settlement agreement filed in court, and motions and orders related thereto,
promotes "informed discussion of governmental affairs" and helps assure "'that
the courts are fairly run and judges are honest') (citations omitted).
120. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1048.
121. See Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161
(3d Cir. 1993) (stating that access assures that judges perform their duties in an
honest and informed matter); Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 682 ("[P]ublic access serves
to promote trustworthiness of the judicial process."); Rittenhouse, 800 F.2d at 345
(stating that public access to settlements "serves as a check on the integrity of the
judicial process"); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1110 (D.C. 1988) (stating
that "public knowledge of the courts is essential to democratic government
because it is essential to rational criticism and reform of the justice system")
(citations omitted). See also REAGAN ET AL., supra note 100, at 1 (discussing
accountability); Resnik, supra note 116, at 784 (describing Bentham's views on
the benefits of public processes).
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are especially important for federal judges, who may serve for life
unless impeached, and those state judges who are not checked by the
political process, because there are few formal mechanisms to hold
them accountable.
Third, public access to settlement agreements and the judicial
approval process promotes public confidence in the integrity of the
judicial system and the conscientiousness of its judges.122 Public
confidence is gained only if the public has an opportunity to observe
courts in action and, to the extent courts are reviewing settlement
agreements, if the public has access to the settlements under
review.123 As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals put it, judges
claim legitimacy "by reason. Any step that withdraws an element of
the judicial process from public view makes the ensuing decision
look more like fiat. .. l24
Fourth, in cases involving issues of general interest to the
public, such as discrimination, voting rights, and antitrust, access to
settlement agreements and the judicial approval process
serve[s] an important prophylactic purpose, providing
an outlet for community concern, hostility, and
Without an awareness that society's
emotion.
responses to [wrongful] conduct are underway,
natural human reactions of outrage and protest are
frustrated and may manifest themselves in some form
of vengeful 'self-help.' . . . The crucial prophylactic

aspects of the administration of justice cannot

122. See Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978)
("The operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of
utmost public concern."); Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598
(1978) (stating that public access serves the "citizen's desire to keep a watchful
eye on the workings of public agencies"); In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 192
(3rd Cir. 2001) (stating that "'[tihe public's exercise of its common law access
right in civil cases promotes public confidence in the judicial system"') (citation
omitted); Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1048 (concluding that monitoring of the judicial
approval process provides the public with "confidence in the conscientiousness,
reasonableness . . . [and] honesty of judicial proceedings").
123. See Rittenhouse, 800 F.2d at 345 (stating that public access to
settlements filed with the court "promotes . . . the 'public perception of fairness

which can be achieved only by permitting full public view of the proceedings')
(citations omitted).
124. Union Oil Co. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000).
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function in the dark... .125
While this "community therapeutic value"126 may be greatest in
criminal cases that provoke shock and anger, "community catharsis
.

.

. is also necessary in civil cases [that raise] issues crucial to the

public," such as discrimination, voting ri hts, antitrust, government
regulation, and bankruptcy, among others. 27
In those cases in which judicial approval of settlements is
required, such as FLSA collective actions, these policies in favor
of public scrutiny are particularly salient because "the public has an
interest in determining whether the Court is properly fulfilling its
duties . . . ." 129 Moreover, the substantive policy objectives
underlying the law-ensuring that workers are paid fair wages and
protected from pressure to work excessive hours, in FLSA casesare served by public scrutiny of the settlement.
Even in cases where judicial approval is not required and the
court disclaims jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, if the judge in
fact approves the parties' settlement before dismissing the case, "the
fact and consequences of his participation are public acts[,]" and
"[t]he public has an interest in knowing what terms of settlement a
federal judge would approve and perhaps therefore nudge the parties
to agree to."' 30
125. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980)
(plurality op.) (addressing a right of public access to criminal trials).
126. Id. at 570.
127. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1179
(6th Cir. 1983). Accord Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15
(1979) (stating that in "some civil cases the public interest in access, and the
salutary effect of publicity, may be as strong as, or stronger than, in most criminal
trials").
128. See supra notes 88-90 (examining FLSA actions).
129. Boone v. City of Suffolk, 79 F. Supp. 2d 603, 609 (E.D. Va. 1999).
Accord Baker v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 2:10cvl99, 2011 WL 166257, at *2 (E.D.
Va. Jan. 19, 2011) (noting that "the public has an interest in determining whether
the Court is properly fulfilling its duties when it approves an FLSA settlement
agreement"); Stalnaker v. Novar Corp., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1264 (M.D. Ala.
2003) (noting that "the sealing from public scrutiny of FLSA agreements between
employees and employers would thwart the public's independent interest in
assuring that employees' wages are fair and thus do not endanger 'the national
health and well-being'") (quoting Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697,
706-07 (1945)).
130. Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2002). Accord LEAP
Sys., Inc. v. MoneyTrax, Inc., 638 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that the
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Where the court dismisses the plaintiffs complaint without
scrutinizing the parties' settlement agreement,131 public access to the
agreement may promote public health and safety if the case involves
a defective product, a negligent physician, an abusive priest, or
another matter affecting public health or safety. 132 When a lawsuit
alleging a defective product or other hazard is filed and settlement of
the claim is publicly disclosed, individuals learn of the danger and
can protect themselves by avoiding it. Government agencies charged
with public safety may glean from the case enough data to justify a
full-blown investigation. 133 On the other hand, if cases identifying
these hazards are settled confidentially, the public may not learn
about the dangers until other individuals suffer harm that could have
been avoided had the case been publicized (or at least had the
settlement been accessible).
For example, it has been reported that people were injured or
killed after certain products (including the drugs Zomax and
Halcion, the Dalkon Shield IUD, certain heart valves, General
Motors pick-up trucks, and Bridgestone/Firestone tires) were
identified as defective, but because claims involving the products
were settled confidentially, unknowing consumers continued to use

public has an interest in knowing the settlement terms that a judge would approve).
131. In such cases, the settlement agreement is not a "judicial record" but
rather a private contract. Jessup, 277 F.3d at 928. See also B.H. v. McDonald, 49
F.3d 294, 300 (7th Cir. 1995) (differentiating private settlements from consent
decrees, which are "entered as judgments and . .. backed by the court's powers of
enforcement").
132. See, e.g., LEAP Sys., Inc., 638 F.3d at 222 (balancing public interest in
health and safety against the need for confidentiality and favoring the former). See
also REAGAN ET AL., supra note 100, at 7-8 (concluding that approximately twofifths of the cases in which settlement agreements were filed under seal involved
matters that "might be of special public interest," including the environment,
product liability, professional malpractice, a public party defendant, a very serious
injury, or sexual abuse); Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Secrecy in the Courts: At the
Tipping Point?, 53 VILL. L. REV. 811, 814-15 (2008) (making the case for public
access); Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C.
L. REV. 927, 948 (2006) (making the argument that secret settlements may
endanger public safety and using examples of secret settlements involving
defective breast implants); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?:
A Philosophicaland Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO.
L.J. 2663, 2695 (1995) (suggesting mass tort settlements inherently implicate
public interests).
133. Dana & Koniak, supra note 57, at 1232.
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them.134 Today, as the nation debates the public health risks posed
by hydraulic fracturing (or "fracking") of shale to release natural gas,
executives from the oil and gas industry maintain that "there is not
one, not one reported case of a freshwater aquifer having ever been
contaminated from hydraulic fracturing. Not one." 135 Yet the
Environmental Protection Agency has documented a contaminated
water well and suggests there may be others that "[r]esearchers ...
were unable to investigate . . . because their details were sealed from

the public when energy companies settled lawsuits with
landowners." 136 Even beyond the public health and safety context,
public access to settlements may deter other undesirable behaviors,
such as employment discrimination, by denying defendants the
option of shielding their discriminatory conduct from public
-137
scrutiny.
134. See id. at 1229-30 (arguing that Firestone would have discontinued
production of defective tires had prior settlements not been secret); Luban, supra
note 57, at 2650-51 n.124 (listing products whose defects were hidden by
protective orders); Richard A. Zitrin, The Case Against Secret Settlements (or,
What You Don't Know Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 115,
119-21 (1999) (identifying products alleged to have been defective that were the
subject of secret settlements); Davan Maharaj, Tire Recall Fuels Drive to Bar
Secret Settlements, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2000, at Al, available at 2000 WLNR
8376803 (examining effects of secret settlements on product safety). But see
Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 428, 480-82 (1991) (questioning the accuracy of
anecdotal reports).
135. Ian Urbina, A Tainted Water Well, and Concern There May Be More,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2011, at Al3, available at 2011 WLNR 15390732 (quoting
Rex W. Tillerson, chief executive officer of ExxonMobil).
136. Id. See also SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., No. 11 Civ.
7387(JSR), 2011 WL 5903733, at *4, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011) (declining to
approve a settlement that would have "deprived [the public] of ever knowing the
truth in a matter of obvious public importance" because the alleged wrongdoer
neither admitted nor denied the government's allegations; "in any case like this
that touches on the transparency of financial markets . . . , there is an overriding

public interest in knowing the truth"); Kirk Johnson, E.P.A. Links Tainted Water in
Wyoming to Hydraulic Fracturingfor Natural Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011, at
A23, available at 2011 WLNR 25454422 (discussing the issue of contaminated
water wells and the effect of the private nature of researchers' efforts).
137. See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST
PRACTICES ADDRESSING
ACCESS IN CIVIL CASES

PROTECTIVE ORDERS,

CONFIDENTIALITY

&

PUBLIC

43 (Mar. 2007) (noting that "disputes . . . brought by

individual consumers or employees to vindicate statutory rights .

.

. may not be

appropriate for private dispute resolution given the public interest in their
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The public may also have an interest in scrutinizing a
settlement (even one not approved by a court) that resolves a claim
against a governmental official.1 38 Just as the public has an interest
in monitoring judges as they perform their official duties, the public
has an interest in monitoring other governmental officials. 39 A
classic example is the public's interest in the Watergate tapes, which
cast light on "an immensely important historical occurrence." 1 40 The
settlement of a claim against a governmental official may cast light
on her performance and may reveal new obligations undertaken by
resolution"); Kotkin, supra note 132, at 930, 952-53 (maintaining that the "whole
thrust of equal employment legislation was that, by facilitating employee suits,
discrimination would be brought to public attention and that the litigation process
would serve to deter other employers from similar conduct").
138. See LEAP Sys., Inc. v. MoneyTrax, Inc., 638 F.3d 216, 222 (3d Cir.
2011) (noting that courts are more likely to require public disclosure when a case
involves a public official); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d
Cir. 1994) (same); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1117 (D.C. 1988) (noting
similar transparency concerns about issues of historical importance). See also THE
SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 137, at 49 (stating that "when a public entity
enters into a settlement, no expectation of confidentiality should exist"); Richard
L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 41 (1983) (conceding that public access to discovery materials "may be
justified .. . when there is a strong public interest in the alleged governmental
misconduct that is the subject of the suit"); id at 50-53 (discussing the "rare cases
in which alleged governmental misconduct justifies access").
139. See FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 410 (1st Cir.
1987) (finding that in cases in which the government is a party, "the public's right
to know what the executive branch is about coalesces with the concomitant right of
the citizenry to appraise the judicial branch"); THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra
note 137, at 49 (arguing for the public's right to know about executive branch
activities); Resnik, supra note 116, at 804 (noting the public interest in observing
the enormity of the power of the bureaucratic state); Janice Toran, Secrecy Orders
and Government Litigants: "A Northwest Passage Around the Freedom of
Information Act"?, 27 GA. L. REV. 121, 127 (1992) (maintaining that arguments
favoring public access to protective orders are "considerably stronger" when the
government is a party); Susan M. Angele, Note, Rule 26(c) Protective Orders and
the FirstAmendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1645, 1656, 1665 (1980) (noting that the
Freedom of Information Act evinces a policy in favor of public access to
governmental material). But see Marcus, supra note 138, at 51 (arguing that
"[e]ven when governmental activity is involved . . . general public access to
confidential materials will only rarely be appropriate").
140. Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 602 (1978). In Nixon,
the Court held that "the common-law right of access to judicial records does not
authorize release of the tapes" because Congress had enacted a statute to govern
access to presidential recordings. Id. at 608.
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the official, which the public may have an interest in monitoring. 14 1
Thus, the public's interest in scrutinizing governmental conduct, also
protected by state right-to-know laws and the Federal Freedom of
Information Act,142 strongly counsels in favor of public access to
settlements resolving claims against governmental officials.143
If the general public has an interest in scrutinizing
settlements of claims affecting health, safety, and government
competency, a subset of the public-litigants, their attorneys, and
judges-has an interest in settlements of claims that are
substantively related to matters they are pressing or charged with
deciding. Just as litigants bargain in the shadow of the law,144
today-when a large fraction of civil cases settle out of courtlitigants bargain in the shadow of settlements. Given the paucity of
jury verdicts, litigants and their attorneys need access to benchmark
settlement figures against which to compare their claims. 145 Thus,
141. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786, 788 ("The public's interest is particularly
legitimate and important where, as in this case, at least one of the parties to the
action is a public entity or official."); StandardFin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d at 410
(discussing the public's interest in monitoring the executive branch). See also
Miller, supra note 134, at 485 (conceding that "public access may be important
when one of the settling litigants is a governmental agency, public entity, or
official"); Toran, supra note 139, at 122 (identifying "the public's undeniable
interest in monitoring the health and safety activities of a government agency")
(footnote omitted).
142. Federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). All fifty
states have some form of freedom-of-information law. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 791
n.29 (citing Toran, supra note 139, at 129 n.38); State Public Record Laws,
FOIADVOCATES, http://www.foiadvocates.com/records.html (last visited Aug. 12,
2011) (linking to the freedom-of-information laws of each state).
143. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 791-92 (discussing the implications of FOIA);
Toran, supra note 139, at 177-78, 181-82 (discussing the same).
144. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950 (1979).
145. See Dor6, supra note 111, at 398 (noting that settlement terms "might
strategically assist other present or future litigants in assessing the settlement value
of their cases"); Kotkin, supra note 132, at 969-70 (discussing how "invisible
settlements" hamper lawyers and judges in subsequent cases); Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 132, at 2680-81 (noting that attorneys rely on reports of settlement
values to guide their demands and settlements); Scott A. Moss, Illuminating
Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of ConfidentialSettlements, 105 MICH. L. REV.
867, 898-900 (2007) (explaining how public access to settlement data may
accelerate the settlement of other filed cases). Cf Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the
Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L.
REv. 497, 567 (1991) (noting that "in a world where all cases settle, it may not
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access to settlement agreements enables litigants in other cases to
accurately value their claims. Not only does access to settlement
data help litigants with related claims, but it also helps courts
determine the adequacy and fairness of proposed settlements. The
Manual for Complex Litigation, for example, encourages courts
reviewing class action settlements to "[i]dentify . . . the historic

values of cases involving the same or similar claims and
defenses."l 46 If settlements are routinely filed under seal, courts will
lack the comparative data needed to gauge the fairness of settlements
submitted for their approval.14 7
Finally, in addition to policies that counsel in favor of access
to settlement agreements themselves, there are strong policies that
counsel in favor of access to the underlying discovery materials, at
least when litigants with related claims exist. Often, an important
term in a confidential settlement agreement is the commitment to
return to the producing party any materials disclosed in discovery.148
But litigants and lawyers pursuing related claims could reduce their
litigation costs if they had access to the discovery materials
uncovered in the settled case, and the judicial system would operate
more efficiently. 149 Likewise, regulatory agencies, charged with
even be possible to base settlements on the merits because lawyers may not be able
to make reliable estimates of expected trial outcomes . . . . In short, there is
nothing to cast a shadow in which the parties can bargain").
146. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.924 (2004).
147. See Alexander, supra note 145, at 566 ("[J]udges ... [will] have little
relevant experience to draw on . . . ."); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases
Settle": JudicialPromotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339,
1385 (1994) (agreeing with Alexander's assessment).
148. See Luban, supra note 57, at 2649 (stating that the defendant "offers
the original plaintiff a generous settlement in return for a promise of secrecy and
the return of the discovery materials").
149. See FRANCIS H. HARE, JR., ET AL., CONFIDENTIALITY ORDERS 24-26,
60-64 (1988) (arguing that plaintiffs are uniquely harmed by protective orders
because they must unnecessarily duplicate the discovery efforts of one another);
Alan B. Morrison, Protective Orders, Plaintiffs, Defendants and the Public
Interest in Disclosure; Where Does the Balance Lie?, 24 U. RICH. L. REv. 109,
115-16 (1989) (stating that failing to allow the sharing of information among
plaintiffs' attorneys maximizes inefficiency). Even Professor Marcus, a strong
advocate of umbrella protective orders to secure confidentiality of discovery
materials, concedes that public access "may be justified when litigants seek to
obtain evidence relevant to other litigation." Marcus, supra note 138, at 41. In his
view, "the most important justification for granting nonparties access to discovery
information is their need to use the information in other litigation." Id. See also
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protecting the public, should have access to information uncovered
in litigation if it would enable them to work more effectively. 10
Professor Luban calls this the "other-litigants argument": "Discovery
material is a public good, which is 'purchased' by one litigant and
should be made available for other litigants to avoid unnecessary
multiplication of expense."1
In sum, public access to settlement agreements submitted to
courts for their approval and to the judicial approval process itself
permits the public to monitor judicial performance as well as the
accuracy of materials and testimony upon which the courts base their
decisions. Public access also promotes public confidence in the
integrity of the judicial system and provides an outlet for public
concern and emotion. Access to unfiled agreements may protect
public health and safety. Moreover, litigants may have unique
interests in gaining access to settlement agreements and the
discovery underlying them if their claims are related to the settled
claims.
While there is a presumptive right of public access to
settlement agreements that are filed in court and to other judicial
records, the right is not absolute.152 A number of competing policies
support confidentiality orders to shield certain settlement agreements
and judicial records from public view. It is to these competing
Exparte Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435, 440 (1915) (stating that "[s]o long as the object
physically exists, anyone needing it as evidence at a trial has a right to call for
it ... however proper and effective the sealing may have been as against the public
at large"). Professor Miller argues that parties will be more likely to contest
discovery in the underlying litigation if they know that "compliance .. . could lead
to uncontrolled dissemination of private or commercially valuable
information. . . ." Miller, supra note 134, at 483.
150. See Morrison, supra note 149, at 123 (arguing that regulatory agencies
should have freer access to litigation materials). Cf Miller, supra note 134, at 494
(cautioning against the release of "any confidential information unrelated to the
potential harm").
151. Luban, supra note 57, at 2653. Accord Morrison, supra note 149, at
122-23 (advocating disclosure of discovery materials to other plaintiffs'
attorneys).
152. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)
(addressing access to audiotapes admitted into evidence at a trial and stating that
the "right to inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute"); LEAP Sys., Inc. v.
MoneyTrax, Inc., 638 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (addressing access to the
transcript of a hearing memorializing a settlement agreement); In re Cendant
Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 194 (3d Cir. 2001) (addressing access to bids to serve as lead
counsel).
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policies that we now turn.
B.

Policies FavoringConfidentialSettlement
Agreements

Several policies that counsel in favor of confidentiality have
greater relevance to discovery materials than to settlement
agreements. For example, few deny the importance of shielding
trade secrets from the public.153 In what may be the classic trade
secret case, a federal district court noted that the formula for CocaCola "is one of the best-kept trade secrets in the world," 1 54 and
concluded that "any disclosure of [the formulae for Coke products]
would be harmful to the company."15 5
Just as few contest a need to protect true trade secrets, few
contest the need to protect the identity of informants who have
provided information to law enforcement officers with an
expectation (and perhaps an assurance) that their names would be
shielded from the public.156 "If such informants in the present or
153.

See Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002) (identifying "a

compelling interest in secrecy .

.

. in the case of trade secrets"); Leucadia, Inc. v.

Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that
documents that hold trade secrets may remain sealed); Dord, supra note 111, at
308 (same); Marcus, supra note 138, at 9 (discussing the merits of withholding
trade secrets); Miller, supra note 134, at 429, 433-34 (same). Rule 26(c)
authorizes issuance of a protective order not only for true trade secrets, but also to
or commercial
development,
research,
confidential
protect "other
CHARLES ALAN
8A
See
also
P.
26(c)(1)(G).
information... ." FED. R. Civ.
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2043, at 302 (4th ed. 2010)
(discussing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G)). But confidential business information
that is not a true trade secret is not entitled to the same level of protection as true
trade secrets. Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 685 (3d Cir. 1988).
154. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107
F.R.D. 288, 289 (D. Del. 1985).
155. Id. at 294. In a suit between the company and its bottlers over the
pricing of Diet Coke syrup, the court nevertheless required disclosure of several
formulae to plaintiffs' trial counsel, subject to the terms of a protective order to be
negotiated by the parties to prevent public disclosure of the secret information. Id.
at 300. This decision is consistent with the advisory committee note to Rule 26(c),
which states that "[t]he courts have not given trade secrets automatic and complete
immunity against disclosure, but have in each case weighed their claim to privacy
against the need for disclosure." FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c), Notes of Advisory
Committee on Rules-1970 Amendment.
156. See Jessup, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that a record can
be sealed in the interest of protecting the identities of informants); United States v.
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future cases anticipate that their cooperation will likely become a
matter of public knowledge, valuable cooperation might cease.", 5 7
And courts have recognized that military secrets and other classified
material affecting national security may be filed under seal or
otherwise shielded from public scrutiny.
But since trade secrets,
informants' identities, military secrets, and other classified
information are rarely disclosed in settlement agreements, these
policies rarely, if ever, justify sealing settlement agreements.
Scholars, courts, and litigants have invoked a variety of other
policies to justify shielding settlement agreements from public view.
For example, some have cited a strong public interest in encouraging
settlements because they save the parties time and money, conserve
scarce judicial resources, and permit the parties to resolve their
disputes creatively in a manner that serves their idiosyncratic
interests.159
Amodeo (Amodeo II), 71 F.3d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the merits of
withholding court documents if there is a risk of injury to a party); United States v.
Amodeo (Amodeo 1), 44 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that, among other
reasons, courts seal trial documents in the interests of furthering law enforcement);
In re Knight Publ'g Co., 743 F.2d 231, 236 (4th Cir 1984) (same); Miller, supra
note 134, at 429 (discussing the merits of sealing trial documents). The Freedom
of Information Act also exempts from its disclosure requirements "records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes" if its production "could
reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source . . . ." 5

U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (2006).
157. Amodeo H1, 71 F.3d at 1052.
158. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1953)
(examining state secrets in a time of "vigorous preparation for national defense");
In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 474, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (discussing the state
secrets privilege shielding classified material); United States v. Progressive, Inc.,
467 F. Supp. 990, 999-1000 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (withholding documents
concerning thermonuclear technology), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir.
1979). But see N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per
curiam) (holding that the government's interest in national security did not justify
an injunction barring the press from publishing the then-classified Pentagon
Papers). The Freedom of Information Act also exempts from its disclosure
requirements "matters that are ... [properly classified as] secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy . . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2006).
159. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse
Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 344-46 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that there is a strong public
interest in encouraging settlement of private litigation); B6champs, supra note 111,
at 128 (noting that settlement saves parties the time, expense, and publicity of an
open trial); Richard P. Campbell, The Protective Order in Products Liability
Litigation:Safeguard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C. L. REV. 771, 835 (1990) (noting that
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According to Professor Marcus, "[a] party may desire a
settlement in part to avoid a trial at which confidential information
will be disclosed. Such a party is likely to condition his willingness
to settle upon the entry of a court order prohibiting the disclosure of
the terms of the settlement or of information obtained through
discovery . . . .

Such settlements may substantially reduce the

burden on the courts."l 60 This interest may be particularly powerful
in massive multi-party cases in which a trial could last months and
cost millions of dollars if a settlement cannot be reached. 161
Similarly, some argue that it is necessary to shield settlement
terms in order to reduce the likelihood of copycat claims.
"Defendants in particular are reluctant to disclose the terms of
settlement lest those terms encourage others to sue." 162 If the
settlement terms are attractive enough, even those without
meritorious claims may bring nuisance suits to extract a
"facilitation of settlements is increasingly being recognized as a 'legitimate and
desirable goal for courts to pursue'); Dor6, supra note 111, at 293, 384 (noting
that "settlement produces significant institutional benefits in addition to benefiting
the immediate parties"); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 132, at 2669-78 (justifying
settlement over adjudication); Miller, supra note 134, at 486 (noting that
settlement reduces need for further governmental involvement, reduces cost of
dispute resolution, and frees judicial resources). Some scholars decry (or at least
critically examine) the rise of settlements and the concomitant loss of the "public
goods" that adjudication produces, such as precedents. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing that the settlement
process should "be treated .

.

. as a highly problematic technique for streamlining

dockets"); Galanter & Cahill, supranote 147, at 1384-86 (noting the dissolution of
legal standards resulting from settlements); Luban, supra note 57, at 2622-26
(noting that settlements fail to produce rules and precedents).
160.

Marcus, supra note 138, at 28. See also THE SEDONA CONFERENCE,

supra note 137, at 42 (stating that "[c]onfidentiality of settlement terms is
generally believed to encourage such settlements"); Miller, supra note 134, at 432,
486 (noting that settlements conserve scarce judicial resources); Moss, supra note
145, at 874, 878 (explaining the traditional model, in which defendants settle "to
avoid costly public disclosures of negative information").
161. See, e.g., In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Secs. Litig., 92 F.R.D. 468, 469-70
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that lawyers had collected millions of documents, more
than a hundred thousand pages of depositions, and more than ten million dollars in
legal fees), aff'd sub nom., FDIC v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1982).
162. Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002). Accord Baker v.
Dolgencorp., Inc., No. 2:Wcvl99, 2011 WL 166257, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 19,
2011) (noting that "confidential settlements provide parties with incentives to
reach amicable resolutions, especially where one party fears that publicity of a
settlement could potentially encourage additional litigation").
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settlement. 163
In addition to concern for copycat claims, litigants have
expressed the fear that public access to the terms of settlements will
improperly influence litigants' expectations in related cases. As a
settling defendant argued in a brief urging the court to approve a
confidential settlement agreement,
The public disclosure could prejudice the parties in
related litigation if they desire to enter into settlement
negotiations in the future by creating an artificial
expectation of the value of that case (which could
impose an artificial ceiling or floor on the
negotiations-ultimately harming one party or the
other). In addition, although the parties here agree
that the settlement agreement does not constitute any
admission of wrongdoing or liability by the
Defendant, there is a significant risk that counsel,
parties, or jurors in similar litigation would treat the
information contained in this settlement agreement as
an indication [that the defendant had violated the

law].164
Professor Miller not only expresses concern for defendants,
who wish to "to avoid encouraging nuisance claims," but also for the
plaintiff, who might face "harassment . . . by unscrupulous free

riders,,,165 such as long-lost relatives seeking a piece of the recovery.
He also expresses concern that public disclosure of a small
settlement with one defendant might undercut the plaintiffs ability
to pursue her claims against other defendants.' 66
Another policy often invoked to shield settlements and other
163. See Miller, supra note 134, at 485 (noting that parties "often have a
compelling interest in keeping the settlement amount confidential to avoid
encouraging nuisance claims"). Professor Moss counters that access to settlement
data may actually decrease the filing of frivolous or "low-odds" claims. See Moss,
supra note 145, at 902-03 (arguing that banning confidentiality may reduce trivial
filings by exposing modest settlement values of similar prior cases).
164. AT&T's Unopposed Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for
Approval of Collective Action Settlement at 3, Dernovish v. AT&T Operations,
Inc., No. 4:09-cv-00015-ODS (W.D. Mo. Jan. 26, 2011), ECF No. 283.
165. Miller, supra note 134, at 485.
166. Id.
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material from the public eye is privacy, 167 especially where the
"subject matter is traditionally considered private rather than public,"
such as "family affairs, illnesses[, and] embarrassing conduct with
no public ramifications . . . ."168 Since discovery processes require
the production of intensely personal information, such as medical
records, financial records, and facts about one's personal life, 169
courts need discretion to shield such disclosures from public view.
These privacy concerns are exacerbated in the information age, when
anyone with a personal computer or smart phone and a credit card
can access litigation papers filed virtually anywhere in the country.
While organizations, such as labor unions and publicly-held
corporations, have "diminished" expectations of privacy, 70 some
scholars argue that their interests in their reputation deserve
protection since "the disclosure of unsubstantiated information could
unjustifiably damage the reputation, profitability, and conceivably

167. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34-36, 35 n.21 (1984)
(discussing the importance of protective orders in discovery); United States v.
Amodeo (Amodeo 1l), 71 F.3d 1044, 1050-51 (2d Cir. 1995) (weighing privacy
concerns against the presumption of access); United States v. Amodeo (Amodeo 1),
44 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1995) (weighing privacy concerns); Pansy v. Borough of
Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3d Cir. 1994) (examining whether good cause
exists for a protective order); 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 153, § 2042, at 22930 ("Because of the liberality of pretrial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(1), it is
necessary for the trial court to have the authority to issue protective orders
conferred by Rule 26(c)."); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 132, at 2683-84 (arguing
that confidentiality can protect privacy rights); Miller, supra note 134, at 447,
464-67, 474-77 (1991) (discussing privacy concerns in litigation, confidentiality,
and protective orders); Resnik, supra note 116, at 808 (noting that the cost of
public adjudication is exposure to the public, which participants in a dispute may
find disquieting).
168. Amodeo H1, 71 F.3d at 1051. Accord Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926,
928 (7th Cir. 2002); Marcus, supra note 138, at 62-63. The Freedom of
Information Act exempts from its disclosure requirements "personnel and medical
files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2006).
169. Miller, supra note 134, at 466-67.
170. Amodeo H1, 71 F.3d at 1052. See also Cippollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc.,
785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that it may be difficult for businesses
to demonstrate embarrassment-a nonmonetizable harm-because their "primary
measure of well-being is presumably monetizable"); Angele, supra note 139, at
1663 ("Only private individuals are protected: a corporation has no legal right to
privacy."); Dord, supra note 111, at 330 (noting that "courts generally frown upon
claims of commercial embarrassment or damaged corporate reputation").
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the viability of a product or even the enterprise itself." 7 1
In conclusion, confidential settlements in the non-class action
context serve a variety of policies, including a need to facilitate
settlements; reduce the risks of copycat claims, unreasonable
expectations, and harassment; and protect personal privacy.

V.

SECRECY AND ACCESS TO CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS

Against this backdrop of the competing policies served by
public access to, and confidentiality of, settlement agreements, let us
now turn to the unique considerations that affect class action
settlements. Statutory, logistical and policy-based constraints all call
into serious question the legality, efficacy, and wisdom of secret
class action settlements.
A.

Statutory and Logistical Constraints

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limits the
parties' freedom to settle a certified class action confidentially. The
Rule provides that a certified class action "may be settled,
voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court's
approval" 72 and requires the court to "direct notice in a reasonable
manner to all class members who would be bound by the
proposal." 73 Moreover, if class members are to be bound by the
settlement, "the court may approve it only after a hearing and on
finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate."' 74
These requirements of judicial scrutiny after notice and a
171. Miller, supra note 134, at 470.
172. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e). The unique issues that arise when the named
representative seeks to dismiss a putative class action that has not been certified
and to settle her individual claims are beyond the scope of this Article. See 5
ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS

§ 11:13, at

20-21 (4th ed. 2002) ("Under certain circumstances, settlement with a class
plaintiff before class certification may be available, with approval of the court.");
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FouRTH)

§§ 21.312, 21.61 (2004) (noting

that when a proposed class has not been certified, special circumstances might lead
a court to impose terms to prevent abuse). For ease of reference, "statutory" is
used in lieu of "Rules-based" constraints.
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1).
174. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
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hearing seriously constrain the parties' ability to shield a class action
settlement from public view.1 By its terms, the Rule requires that
absent class members be notified of the settlement. In those class
actions in which the names and addresses of the class members are
unknown,176 notice by publication in print media or via television,
radio or the Internet may be ordered. 177 In such cases, it will be
impossible to shield the settlement's general terms from the

public.178
Even in cases where the class members' names and addresses
are known and notice of the settlement can be mailed to them, the
class itself may include hundreds of thousands 79 or even millions of
members. 180 Once that many people learn the terms of the
175. Accord NAT'L Assoc. OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES, NACA CLASS
ACTION GUIDELINES 47 (2006), available at http://www.naca.net/sites/default/
files/pdfs/RevisedGuidelines.pdf (stating that "[class action documents must
remain open and available to the public in virtually all circumstances"); Marcus,
supra note 138, at 49 n.206 (stating that "[i]n view of the extent of disclosure and
judicial evaluation of the merits, it is questionable whether class actions can often
be settled on a confidential basis"); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 132, at 2695
(noting that "courts must engage in some scrutiny of the adequacy of counsel and
the reasonableness of [a class action] settlement").
176. For example, in a class action filed on behalf of millions of purchasers
of Milli Vanilli records, tapes and CDs, the names and addresses of the absent
class members were presumably unknown. Freedman v. Arista Records, Inc., 137
F.R.D. 225, 226-27 (E.D. Pa. 1991). See also Reuters, Small Victory for Milli
Vanilli Fans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1991 (late ed.), at 16, availableat 1991 WLNR
3030334 (discussing the Milli Vanilli case).
177. See 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, § 1797.6, at 201-02 (3d ed. 2005) (describing the ways in which
notice may be ordered); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.312
(2004) (same).
178. See 5 CONTE &NEWBERG, supra note 172, § 11:53, at 164 (stating that
the notice under Rule 23(e) "must inform class members . . . of the settlement's
general terms").
179. See, e.g., Brown v. Cameron-Brown Co., 92 F.R.D. 32, 37 (E.D. Va.
1981) (finding that the numerosity requirement was satisfied where "plaintiffs
assert the class to number 'at least several thousand' and the defendants refer to a
potential class of 200,000"); Fischer v. Weaver, 55 F.R.D. 454, 458 (N.D. Ill.
1972) (considering a class with 833,055 members).
180. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011)
(reviewing a class action with 1.5 million members); Freedman, 137 F.R.D. at 228
(stating that "[i]t is safe to assume that 7,000,000 people cannot be joined
practically to one litigation"); Kendler v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 88 F.R.D.
688, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (considering a class estimated to include 1.9 million
members).
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settlement, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to keep its
terms secret. After all, in deciding whether to accept the terms of the
settlement, to object, or to opt out (assuming that remains an option),
the class members may need to discuss the terms of the settlement
with their partners, parents, and children; their attorneys and
accountants; and other trusted advisors. It is difficult to imagine that
even a court committed to ensuring the confidentiality of a class
action settlement would deny class members that opportunity.
But once the absent class members, their family members,
and other advisors learn the terms of the settlement, both legal and
logistical constraints limit the efficacy of a confidentiality
requirement, even one imposed by court order. If any of the absent
class members or non-party family members or other advisors were
to disclose the terms of the settlement, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for the court to identify which individual(s) had breached
confidentiality. Even if the court, somehow, could identify the
person(s) who had revealed the terms of the settlement, it would lack
authority to sanction a non-party. Unlike absent class members, who
are deemed, however improbably, to have consented to the court's
jurisdiction by declining to opt out, 18 1 non-parties are neither served
with process nor afforded an opportunity to opt out from which their
consent might be inferred.
Rule 65(d), which has been read to govern not only
injunctions but all "equitable decrees compelling obedience under
the threat of contempt,"182 provides that such decrees bind only
parties and their "officers, agents, servants, employees, and
attorneys," and "other persons who are in active concert or
participation" with them if they "receive actual notice of [the decree]
181. In PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Supreme Court held that absent
class members who lack minimum contacts with the forum state nevertheless may
be bound by the court's judgment because they consent to jurisdiction by declining
to opt out. 472 U.S. 797, 812-14 (1985). For critiques of this consent rationale,
see Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in
Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1529, 1561-62 (2004); Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion
Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148, 1170 n.95,
1185-86 (1998); Rhonda Wasserman, The Curious Complications with Back-end
Opt-out Rights, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 407-12 (2007).
182. 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, § 2955, at 309 (2d ed. 1995) (citing, inter alia, Int'l Longshoremen's
Ass'n, Local 1291 v. Phil. Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 75 (1967)).
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by personal service or otherwise . . . .',183 The non-parties with
whom absent class members might consult likely would not receive
notice of a court order requiring confidentiality and might well be
beyond the court's jurisdiction. If the class has not yet been
certified, even the putative absent class members themselves might
be beyond the court's authority.18 4 Thus, it is highly unlikely that the
court would have authority to punish a breach of confidentiality even
if it could identify the individual(s) who released the terms of the
settlement.
In addition to requiring notice to absent class members of the
proposed settlement, Rule 23(e) requires the court to conduct a
"hearing" before approving a class action settlement.18 5 While Rule
23 does not, by its terms, require that the hearing be open to the
public, and while Rule 77(b) permits proceedings other than trials on
the merits to be "conducted by a judge in chambers,"' 86 there is a
large body of precedent that strongly supports a right of public
access to fairness hearings. For more than thirty years, the Supreme
Court has recogized a First Amendment right of public access to
criminal trials and pretrial proceedings in criminal cases. 88 While
the Court has not had occasion to consider whether there is a First
Amendment right to attend civil trials,1 89 all of the federal Courts of
183. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2).
184. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379-80 (2011) (rejecting
the "surely erroneous argument that a nonnamed class member is a party to the
class-action litigation before the class is certified' and stating that "[n]either a
proposed class action nor a rejected class action may bind nonparties") (quoting
Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 16 n.1 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
185. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). Before 2003, federal courts had discretion
whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing before approving a class action
settlement. 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 177, § 1797.5, at 178-80. In 2003, the
Rule was amended and "settlement hearings now are mandatory." Id at 180 & 51
(2010 Supp.).
186. FED. R. Civ. P. 77(b).
187. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604-06 (1982)
(discussing why a right of access to criminal trials is protected by the First
Amendment); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980)
(plurality op.) ("[T]he right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of
the First Amendment . . .").

188. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986) (holding
that the First Amendment "right of access applies to preliminary hearings"). See
also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 508-10 (1984) (finding a
"presumption of openness" to the jury selection process in criminal cases).
189. See Whistleblower 14106-lOW v. Comm'r, 137 T.C. No. 15, 2011 WL
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Appeals that have considered the issue have held such a right
exists. 190
As the Sixth Circuit stated in Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. FTC, "[t]hroughout our history, the open courtroom has
been a fundamental feature of the American judicial system." 1 91
And as the Seventh Circuit declared in Union Oil Co. of Californiav.
Leavell, "[w]hat happens in the halls of government is presumptively
public business. Judges deliberate in private but issue public
decisions after public arguments based on public records."l 92 If, as
these cases suggest, the First Amendment guarantees the public a
right to attend a class action fairness hearing, it will be impossible to
keep the terms of the settlement secret.
Even if the First Amendment does not secure a right of public
access to civil trials, Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that "[a]t trial, witnesses' testimony must be
taken in open court" unless otherwise provided by law or in

6110061, at *4 n.8 (2011) (stating that the Supreme Court "has not expressly ruled
on whether there is a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings and
documents"). Cf Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17 (plurality op.)
(stating that "[w]hether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a
question not raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil and
criminal trials have been presumptively open").
190. See, e.g., Whistleblower 14106-10W, 2011 WL 6110061, at *4 n.8
(noting that the "Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue agree that there is
such a constitutional right"); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110,
120, 124 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the public has a right to attend trials); Detroit
Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 700 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding that
"Deportation hearings, and similar proceedings, have traditionally been open to the
public"); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir.1984) ("We
hold that the First Amendment does secure a right of access to civil proceedings.");
In re Cont'l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984) (agreeing that "the
policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil
cases as well"); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1983)
(deciding that "civil trials which pertain to the release or incarceration of prisoners
and the conditions of their confinement are presumptively open to the press and
public"). See also Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.
1988) (holding that "the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also
apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil
case"). Cf N.J. Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 204-05 (3d Cir. 2002)
(concluding that there is no First Amendment right to attend administrative
deportation proceedings).
191. 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983).
192. 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
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compelling circumstances. 193 If the fairness hearing is characterized
as a trial, the Rules, too, require that it be open to the public.
Finally, the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") requires
defendants participating in proposed class action settlements to serve
upon state and federal governmental officials the class action
complaint, the proposed settlement, any side deals, and related
documents. 194 The purpose of this provision is to ensure that
responsible governmental officials are "in a position to react if the
settlement appears unfair to some or all class members or
inconsistent with applicable regulatory policies." 195 In fact, these
government officials sometimes appear in court at the fairness
hearing and voice their objections to proposed class action
settlements.196 It would be difficult, if not impossible, for these
governmental officials to perform their duties under the statute if
they were ordered to maintain the materials received "as confidential
in order to maintain the confidentiality of the settlement. . . ."197
Read together, Rule 23, CAFA, and the resulting logistical
constraints render it impossible for the parties, the court, and other
governmental officials to keep the terms of a class action settlement
confidential. These constraints serve a variety of policies supporting
public access to class action settlements to which we now turn.
B.

Policy-BasedConstraints

As the Third Circuit stated in a case involving public access
to bids submitted by attorneys seeking to serve as class counsel, the
"right of public access is particularly compelling" 1 98 in the class
193.
194.
195.

R. Civ. P. 43(a).
28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (2006).
S. REP. No. 109-14, at 27 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
FED.

32.
196. See Nicholas M. Pace & William B. Rubenstein, How TransparentAre
Class Action Outcomes? EmpiricalResearch on the Availability of Class Action
Claims Data, SSRN 7, July 2008, available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1206315
(providing an example of government officials' objections to proposed
settlements).
197. Order of Court, supra note 41, at 3. See also supra notes 34-44 and
accompanying text (discussing the court order entered in the B'nai B'rith
litigation).
198. In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 193 (3d Cir. 2001). See also id. at
194 (stating that the "test for overriding the right of access [in a class action]
should be applied . .. with particular strictness").
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action context. Even Professor Miller concedes that "public access
may be important . .. when the settlement is a court-approved class

settlement . . . ."199 Numerous differences between standard civil
suits and class actions help explain why public access is particularly
important in this context.
In standard civil litigation, the client retains an attorney to
represent her, while reserving "ultimate authority" over the
important decisions to be made in the suit, 2 00 including whether or
not to settle and on what terms. 20 1 While the client's ability to
monitor her attorney's performance is limited, the rules of
professional ethics enhance that ability by requiring the attorney to
"promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with
respect to which the client's informed consent . . . is required ... ;

reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the
client's objectives are to be accomplished; [and] . . . keep the client
reasonably informed about the status of the matter . ... 202 These

rules assume that a client who is informed of the progress of her suit
and who retains decision-making authority will be a more effective
monitor.203
Unlike this standard litigation model, the attorney
representing a class is often the driving force behind the lawsuit, has
more at stake financially than any individual class member, and
rarely communicates with absent class members, who are dispersed
and disorganized and lack incentive to monitor the conduct of their
ostensible agent.20 4 Even the named representative may have little
199. Miller, supra note 134, at 485-86.
200. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a), 1.2 cmt. (2006) (stating
that "a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the
means by which they are to be pursued").
201.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. (2006) (requiring "a

lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil
controversy ... [to] promptly inform the client of its substance").
202.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(1)-(3) (2006).

203. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendationsfor Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1991).
204. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation:
BalancingFairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 884-85 (1987) (explaining that "the members of a plaintiff class usually have
very little capacity to monitor their agents"); Macey & Miller, supra note 203, at 3,
7-8, 19-20; William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and
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influence over the lawyer representing the class.20 5 In this context,
the risks of collusion between the defendant and class counsel and of
a deal that would maximize class counsel's fee while minimizing
recovery for the class are of real concern.2 06
To reduce these risks, Federal Rule 23 bars class action
settlements without judicial approval and permits the court to
approve a class action settlement only if it finds "that it is fair,
reasonable, and adequate."207 While judicial scrutiny of settlements
is particularly important in the class action context, it is not a
panacea both because the reviewing court lacks the information it
needs to assess the settlement's fairness and because the court has its
own incentive to favor class action settlements. 208 If a court
approves a class action settlement (whether fair or not), it is freed of
the burden of overseeing a large and potentially time-consuming

Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REv. 1435, 1441-43 (2006).
205. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability
Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 288, 297 n.22 (2010) (analyzing the powerlessness
of named representatives); Macey & Miller, supra note 203, at 5, 20 (arguing that
class members have no incentive to take on a "litigation monitor" role because
they would incur individual costs, with only a pro rata share of the benefits);
Geoffrey P. Miller, Competing Bids in Class Action Settlements, 31 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 633, 634 n.2 (2003) (same).
206. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer
on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 626, 647-48 (1986/1987) (describing "structural
collusion"); Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461,
470-73 (2000) [hereinafter Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions] ("The attorney's
interest in securing the highest fee and the class members' interest in attaining the
greatest recovery often diverge."). The additional risks posed by side deals,
pursuant to which inventories of claims would be settled at a premium outside of
the class action in order to reduce the presence of objectors, have been reduced by
the enactment of Rule 23(e)(3), which requires the "parties seeking approval" to
"file a statement identifying any agreement made in connection with the proposal."
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e)(3). See Dana & Koniak, supra note 57, at 1233-40
(describing the unique risks of collusion posed by such side deals and exacerbated
by secrecy).
207. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(e)(2).
208. See Dana & Koniak, supra note 57, at 1234-35 (arguing that parties
have incentives to conceal information regarding the unfairness of a settlement to
the court, and that the court has an interest in approving the settlement to clear its
docket); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA.
L. REv. 1051, 1105-15 (1996) (same); Rubenstein, supra note 204, at 1445
(same); Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, supra note 206, at 479-83 (discussing
the "informational disadvantage" of courts in fairness hearings).
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case.209 It may also gain prestige as the court that oversaw the
settlement of a complex class action.210 Thus, courts may be too
quick to approve settlements regardless of their adequacy.
Proposals advocating the appointment of a guardian ad litem
to represent the interests of the class during the settlement process or
a "devil's advocate" to raise objections to any proposed class action
settlement211 have not gained traction with the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules. 212 In the absence of a guardian or class advocate, the
public's role in scrutinizing class action settlements and the judicial
approval process itself assumes particular importance.
As suggested in Part III.A above, public access to settlements
submitted for judicial approval helps police the accuracy of materials
submitted to the court in connection with the settlement and ensure
that courts perform their reviews with diligence and care. Given the
court's unique role in protecting the interests of the class and given
the risk that the court's self-interest may skew the process in favor of
approval, these monitoring functions are particularly important in the
class action context. A court order shielding a class action
209.

See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 208, at 1122-23, 1127 (discussing

judicial self-interest); Luban, supra note 57, at 2660 (suggesting that settlement
was reached in part as a result of the court's "overwhelming interest in damming
the flood of asbestos cases"); Macey & Miller, supra note 203, at 45-46 ("If the
judge approves the settlement, the result will be to remove a potentially complex
and time-consuming case from the judge's calendar."); Rubenstein, supra note
204, at 1445 ("Settlement removes the matter from the judge's docket, not an
unimportant factor in a time of onerous caseloads."); Wasserman, Dueling Class
Actions, supra note 206, at 476 ("[T]he court may . . . have an interest in
approving a settlement to clear its docket.").
210. See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 208, at 1123 (arguing that "[j]udicial
self interest may lead judges to seek power, prestige, and autonomy," which is
gained by overseeing high-profile cases); Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions,
supra note 206, at 476, n.73 (citing Koniak & Cohen in arguing that judges
occasionally act in their own self-interest).
211. See Macy & Miller, supra note 203, at 47-48 (discussing various
proposals for appointing a guardian ad litem to reform the current class action
system); Rubenstein, supra note 204, at 1453-56, 1475-77 (advocating the
appointment of "an attorney to argue against the settlement"); Wasserman,
Dueling Class Actions, supra note 206, at 529 (endorsing a proposal advanced by
Professor John Leubsdorf that defendant and class counsel should be required to
post bond for the appointment of a court-appointed advocate who would scrutinize
the fairness of the proposed settlement).
212. See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 208, at 1109 n.190 (describing
judges' and lawyers' "chilly reception" of Professor Leubsdorf's proposal).
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settlement from public view would obviously compromise the
public's ability to serve in this role.
Like absent class members, the public at large may lack the
incentives and the data needed to scrutinize the adequacy of the
settlement. 213 But public interest groups may appear and voice their
objections to a class action settlement (assuming it is accessible to
them).2 14 Moreover, the government officials that receive notice of
proposed class action settlements under CAFA sometimes appear in
court and voice their objections 2 1 5-that is, as long as no court bars
them from voicing their objections in open court. And one should
not underestimate the efficacy of press coverage, which a right of
public access enables, both in monitoring the judicial approval
process and in notifying the public of health and safety threats that
21
are the subject of litigation.216
After all, while Joe Q. Public may
lack the incentive and resources to assess the fairness of a particular
settlement, investigative journalists are paid to research, expose
wrongdoing and write about it. For example, while the media
coverage of the fen-phen litigation may not have affected the
ultimate recovery by class members, it certainly shed considerable
light on the behavior of class counsel, the doctors they relied upon
for medical expertise, and the judicial review process.2 17 The fallout
of that press scrutiny is arguably still being felt, as one state bar
association recently recommended the disbarment of both a
213. Even class member objectors are frequently denied the opportunity to
take the discovery needed to assess the adequacy of the settlement. See, e.g.,
Koniak & Cohen, supra note 208, at 1109-10 (noting that "discovery accorded
objectors in the settlement process is limited"); Wasserman, Dueling Class
Actions, supra note 206, at 477-78 (same). It is highly unlikely that members of
the public at large would have access to the data needed to assess the settlement's
fairness.
214. Pace & Rubenstein, supra note 196, at 7; Rubenstein, supra note 204,
at 1450-51.
215. Pace & Rubenstein, supra note 196, at 7. But see Rubenstein, supra
note 204, at 1448 (noting that CAFA does not require the government officials to
comment on the adequacy of the proposed settlement or to do anything else).
216. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 132, at 2686-87 (noting that "[p]ress
coverage and open court hearings . . . facilitate . . . public discourse").

217. See Alison Frankel, Third Circuit (Again) Upholds $567 Million Fee
Award in Fen-Phen Class Action, AM. LAWYER, June 8, 2010 (describing the fenphen litigation); Alison Frankel, $982 an Hourfor Fen-Phen Plaintiffs' Lawyers,
AM. LAWYER, Apr. 10, 2008 (same); Alison Frankel, Still Ticking: Mistaken
Assumptions, Greedy Lawyers, and Suggestions of FraudHave Made Fen-Phen a
Disasterofa Mass Tort, AM. LAWYER, Mar. 1 2005 (same).
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prominent class action attorney who represented claimants in fenphen litigation filed in state court and the judge who approved the
settlement of that case. 2 18
Public (and media) access to class action settlements not only
permits testing of the accuracy of the data upon which settlements
are predicated and monitoring of judicial performance, but it also
provides an outlet for the release of public sentiment on matters2 1of9
public importance and reduces the risk of "vengeful 'self-help."'
Since class actions, by definition, affect large groups of people and
often involve matters of great public importance, such as
discrimination or environmental contamination, this policy in favor
of public access appears particularly strong in the class action
context. Likewise, public access to class action settlements permits
notice to the public of health and safety risks posed by the product or
behavior that underlies the litigation. If a confidentiality order
barred class members from discussing not only the settlement but
also the problem that gave rise to the litigation, it could inhibit
reporting to governmental agencies such as the Consumer Product
Safety Commission and the National Highway Safety Traffic
Administration, which would greatly compromise their effectiveness.
Finally, while class actions are intended to resolve the claims
of large groups of similarly-situated class members in a single
proceeding, they often fail to include all those affected by the
defendant's conduct or product. For example, given the choice-oflaw problems that can arise in nationwide class actions,220 lawyers
often structure class actions to include only class members from a
single state.2 2 1 Class members injured by the same product but
218. See Peter Smith, Lawyer Faces New Troubles, THE COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 13, 2011, at Bl, available at 2011 WLNR 23518428;
Andrew Wolfson, Fen-PhenJudge Under FireAgain; Ky. Bar Association Wants
Bamberger Disbarredover Diet-Drug Case, THE COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.),
June 17, 2011, at Al, available at 2011 WLNR 12192510.
219. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (citing and discussing
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) (plurality op.)).
220. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22
(1985) (applying constitutional limitations on choice of law in a nationwide class
action suit).
221. See, e.g., Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 73 (2008) (challenging
cigarette advertising in the context of a statewide class action and considering
whether a state unfair trade practices statute was preempted by federal law). Cf
Dana & Koniak, supra note 57, at 1233-34 (explaining that class actions are
sometimes structured so as to exclude plaintiffs whose claims are settled outside
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living in different states, who may be participating in other statewide
class actions or pressing individuals suits, would benefit from access
to the benchmark settlement figures produced in the first class action
to settle.222
In sum, many of the policies identified in Part III.A counsel
in favor of public access to class action settlement agreements with
particular force. While they also counsel strongly in favor of public
access to settlement agreements in FLSA collective actions, there are
differences between the two types of group litigation that may
explain why courts appear more willing to seal settlements in the
FLSA context. First, class members in FLSA cases can be bound
223th
Thus, they are aware of the
only if they affirmatively opt in.
litigation, are sometimes required to participate in discovery, 224 and
presumably have at least some contact with the attorney representing
the class.22 5 The need for public scrutiny of the approval process in
such cases may be less obvious. Second, since class members in
FLSA cases are all employees of the same employer and often work
together in the same plant, they may be less dispersed and
disorganized than class members in the typical Rule 23(b)(3) class
action and therefore better able to monitor the attorney representing
Although there are good reasons to doubt this
them. 226
conclusion, 227 it, too, may explain what appears to be a greater
the class action in an effort to "buy off' potential objectors).
222. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of such
access).
223. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). See also supra note 90 and accompanying
text (discussing § 216(b) opt-in requirement).
224. See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Royal & Sunalliance USA, Inc., No. C05-1774MAT, 2006 WL 2091097, at *1-3 (W.D. Wash. July 25, 2006) (allowing
defendants to conduct depositions of all opt-in plaintiffs); Coldiron v. Pizza Hut,
Inc., No. CVO3-05865TJHMCX, 2004 WL 2601180, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25,
2004) (allowing the same).
225. See Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action:
How Courts Thwart Wage Rights by Misapplying ClassAction Rules, 61 AM. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 4-6, 14, 30-32, 42-43) (positing that the
agency problems and asymmetric information problems that plague Rule 23 class
actions are far less pronounced in FLSA collective actions).
226. Cf id at 26 (noting that in FLSA cases, the claims of the employees
against the same employer are "presumptively similar").
227. See Becker & Strauss, supra note 90, at 1325-29 (suggesting that lowwage workers often decline to opt into FLSA collective actions because they do
not receive the notice; do not understand it; or lack the knowledge, experience or
fortitude to sue their employer).
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willingness on the part of courts to seal settlements in FLSA
collective actions.
Whether or not the FLSA cases should be treated differently,
it is clear that regarding Rule 23 class actions, numerous policies
strongly counsel in favor of public access to both filed settlement
agreements and the judicial approval process. And the policies often
cited in support of confidentiality are unlikely to overcome the
presumptive right of access to class action settlement agreements
submitted for judicial review.
First, class action settlement agreements rarely, if ever,
contain trade secrets, identify confidential informants or disclose
military secrets. Settlement amounts themselves are obviously not
trade secrets.2 28 If ever there is a case in which a trade secret,
informant's name, or military secret is disclosed in a class action
settlement agreement, the secret itself can be shielded from the
public without shielding the entire settlement agreement. 229
Second, while settlements may conserve both private and
public resources and enable the parties to resolve their disputes in
ways that best serve their idiosyncratic interests, one should question
the frequent claim that parties will decline to settle unless they are
assured confidentiality. 2 10 After all, whether or not a confidentiality
order issues, the parties will save time and money and reduce risk if
they settle. 23 1 And if they are genuinely worried about publicity, the
alternative of a public trial likely will bring even more unwanted
publicity. 232 Data from the United States District Court for the
228. Dana & Koniak, supra note 57, at 1226.
229. See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2000)
("Litigation about trade secrets regularly is conducted in public; the district court
seals only the secrets (and writes an opinion omitting secret details); no one would
dream of saying that every dispute about trade secrets must be litigated in
private.").
230. See, e.g., Zitrin, supra note 134, at 118 (stating that "there are no
empirical studies or even 'anecdotal' evidence indicating that it is actually harder
to attain a settlement when secrecy is not permitted"). In fact, Professor Moss's
economic analysis suggests that a ban on confidential settlements likely would
"accelerate settlement." Moss, supra note 145, at 887 (emphasis added). See also
id at 892, 910 (offering further economic analysis of a potential ban on
confidential settlements).
231. See, e.g., B6champs, supra note 111, at 130 (arguing that "[g]iving
preference to the public interest in access should not seriously hinder efforts to
settle").
232. See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 788 (3d Cir. 1994)
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District of South Carolina, which enacted a local rule barring sealed
settlements in 2002,233 reveals a decline in the number of trials
following enactment of the rule, suggesting that parties prefer public
settlements to public trials. 234 Thus, the claim that parties will
decline to enter into class action settlements unless they are assured
confidentiality seems overstated.
Third, while defendants may fear that a public settlement will
give rise to copycat claims,2 3 5 this fear is not likely to justify an order
sealing a class action settlement. If a public settlement apprises
others who have been injured by the defendant's product or wronged
by its conduct of their potential right to recover, the defendant's
interest in evading or reducing its liability to those with meritorious
claims hardly justifies confidentiality.236 While the defendant has a
legitimate interest in avoiding trumped-up charges, that interest may
not be best served by sealing the class action settlement. As
Professors Dana and Koniak argue, "[t]he most effective way for a
defendant to combat truly frivolous suits, arguably, would be to
prevail (or pay only a nominal settlement) and publicize, rather than
hide, the outcome." 2 37 While this advice will not help a defendant
who settles bona fide claims in the class action and fears frivolous
copycat claims if the settlement is publicized, that risk seems no
greater than the risk of copycat claims following a trial of the class
claims, something that surely would occur in public. It is unclear
why the concern for copycat claims would justify an order sealing a
class action settlement any more than an order closing the courthouse
door. And while it is true that settlement values in a class action
may influence the expectations of litigants in related cases, one must
question whether that concern is sufficient to overcome a
("[I]f the case goes to trial, even more is likely to be disclosed than if the public
had access to pretrial matters."); Zitrin, supra note 134, at 118 ("[P]arties who
don't want their conduct exposed still have substantial incentive to settle before the
heightened scrutiny of a trial.").
233. D.S.C. LOCAL CIv. R. 5.03(E) ("No settlement agreement filed with the
Court shall be sealed pursuant to the terms of this Rule.").
234. Anderson, supra note 132, at 817 n.34.
235. District Judge Anderson of the United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina finds this argument persuasive. Id. at 818.
236. Moss, supra note 145, at 902 (discussing the possibility that "some of
the 'copycats' are deserving plaintiffs who simply had not known enough to sue")
(footnote omitted).
237. Dana & Koniak, supra note 57, at 1225.
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presumptive right of access to a settlement agreement filed with a
court for its approval.
Finally, while personal privacy interests may justify
confidentiality orders in certain cases, the corporations, labor unions
and other institutions that are the typical class action defendants have
diminished expectations of privacy. 238 Like the "repeat players" in
Professor Marc Galanter's classic article, "Why the 'Haves' Come
Out Ahead," they may have legitimate interests in "maintaining
credibility

. . . as

combatant[s]"

and in

their "bargaining

reputation[s]." 239 But in class actions, where the law requires
judicial scrutiny of the fairness and adequacy of settlements, it is
difficult to conclude that corporations' interests in their reputations
as tough bargainers can outweigh the presumptive right of the public
to monitor the courts.

VI.

CONCLUSION

It may be that the class action that first attracted my attention,
Hirschfield v. B'nai B'rith International-inwhich the court agreed
to seal not only the settlement agreement itself, but also the transcript
of the fairness hearing and the objections filed by absent class
members-is a very rare breed. Certainly my modest efforts to learn
the scope of the practice-through a Westlaw search and an
examination of the class actions filed in a single federal judicial
district-suggest as much, although a more comprehensive study by
the FJC found that 6% of all settlements filed under seal involve
*240
class actions.
Even if secret class action settlements are rare, it is
nevertheless a useful exercise to understand the constraints on the
practice. A combination of statutory, logistical and policy-based
considerations all constrain the discretion of federal district courts to
238. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (citing several examples of
the diminished privacy expectations of institutional defendants); Zitrin, supra note
134, at 119 ("[P]ersonifying corporations by ascribing to them intensely personal
feelings-including annoyance and embarrassment-stretches credulity.").
239. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95, 99 (1974). See also Moss,
supra note 145, at 878 (admitting that repeat class action defendants may be
concerned about developing a "reputation for settling").
240. See supra note 104 (citing to the FJC study).
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seal class action settlements. Both Rule 23, which requires notice to
class members of proposed settlements and judicial review at
fairness hearings, and CAFA, which requires notice to governmental
officials of proposed class action settlements so they can "react" if
the settlements are unfair, seriously limit the court's authority to
shield class action settlement agreements from public scrutiny. Even
if a court were to order absent class members to keep the terms of a
proposed class action settlement confidential, it would be a logistical
nightmare to police such an order.
Moreover, the inability of absent class members to monitor
the behavior of their agent (the class counsel) highlights the need for
judicial scrutiny of class action settlements. And the court's
potential bias in favor of approval highlights a need for public
scrutiny of the court itself. Such scrutiny would be impossible if the
public were denied access to the very settlement agreement that was
the subject of judicial review. Thus, secret class action settlements
should be very rare indeed given that public access to class action
settlement agreements is a critical prerequisite to public monitoring
of the judicial approval process.

